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WHERE TO PRAY? RELIGIOUS ZONING AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Mark W. Cordes*
INTRODUCTION

Zoning regulations have historically enjoyed a strong presumption
of validity, and courts have applied the deferential "mere rationality" standard of review to assess their constitutionality. 1 In recent
years, however, the Supreme Court has stated in several contexts
that this usual deference to local zoning decisions does not prevail
when fundamental interests are implicated. 2 The most notable example is in the area of free speech, where the Court has applied an inter-

mediate standard of scrutiny in reviewing zoning ordinances.' Lower
courts have responded in a significant number of cases to this mandate, primarily when reviewing restrictions on adult entertainment
and billboards, the two principal areas affected."
Despite this emerging recognition that the normal rules do not apply when zoning affects first amendment activities, the Supreme
Court has not yet definitively addressed zoning restrictions that affect the exercise of religion. 5 As with other land uses, churches have
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University; B.S. 1975, Portland State

University; J.D. 1980, Willamette University; J.S.M. 1983, Stanford University.
1. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (citing Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)
(citing Cusack Co. v, City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1917); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905)). See generally D. MANDELKER, LAND USE CONTROLS
§ 2.38 (1981); 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 7.05 (1975 & Supp. 1986).
Although in theory, minimal scrutiny is applied to zoning controls, the amount of scrutiny actually applied varies widely among the states, with a few states closely scrutinizing zoning decisions in a manner reminiscent of Lochner-era substantive due process. See 1 N. WILLIAMS,
supra, §§ 6.01-44; Smith, The Uncertain State of Zoning Law in Illinois, 60 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 93, 93-100 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1977) (plurality opinion) (zoning ordinance which prohibited grandmother from living with grandson "slic[ed]
deeply into the family" and was therefore subject to greater judicial scrutiny).
3. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490(1981); Schad v. Borough of
Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
See generally Mandelker, The Free Speech Revolution in Land Use Law, 60 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 51 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Basiardanes v. Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982) (adult use regulation); Major Media of the Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 621 F. Supp. 1446 (E.D.N.C.
1985) (billboard regulation); Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (adult use regulation); John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp. 1272 (D. Me.
1978) (billboard regulation).
5. The Supreme Court has dismissed, for lack of a substantial federal question, appeals
from decisions of several state court cases which upheld the validity of particular zoning
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long been made subject to a variety of zoning restrictions. 6 Despite
various constitutional issues that arise in this setting, until recently,
church zoning decisions have been the exclusive realm of the state
courts. Most states, although recognizing the legitimacy of some
zoning controls on churches, have traditionally restricted a
municipality's ability to regulate church location. Surprisingly, these
restrictions usually have been based on substantive due process and

not first amendment grounds.'
As both the goals of land use planning and the nature of churches
have changed, municipal tolerance for, and judicial protection of,
religious land uses has waned. In the last several decades there has
been a significant and increased move toward developing residential
neighborhoods and even entire residential communities. In many
ways the low density residential use has emerged as the pinnacle of
land use planning. 8 The Supreme Court itself has recognized the
substantial interests of municipalities in creating residential enclaves
and preserving them from the intrusions accompanying more intense
land uses.'
restrictions as applied to churches. See Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330
P.2d 255 (1958), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203
P.2d 823, appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949), reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 939 (1950); Damascus
Community Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 610 P.2d 273 (1980), appeal
dismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981). The Supreme Court has noted that its dismissal of an appeal
for lack of a substantial federal question is a decision on the merits and therefore binding
precedent as to "the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions."
Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 499. At the same time, however, the Court has noted that such
summary actions do not have as much precedential authority as decisions rendered after plenary
consideration, are very limited in scope, and are not binding to the extent that more recent
developments in Supreme Court doctrine might change the outcome of the case. See id. at 500.
The Supreme Court in dictum has also noted that churches can be made subject to the zoning power. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (building and zoning regulations
are necessary and permissible forms of government regulation of churches). This general
recognition that churches may be subject to zoning restrictions, however, does not address the
potential limits of such regulations.
6. Churches can be made subject to the various zoning controls typically applied to land
uses. Generally, these are locational controls on where churches can locate, site development
controls such as setback, sideyard, and bulk restrictions, and restrictions regarding what are
considered permissible accessory uses. See generally 3A N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, §§ 77.01,
77.18-.19 (rev. ed. 1985).
7. See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233
Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954); State ex rel. Roman Catholic Bishop v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231, 90
P.2d 217 (1939); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., I N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154
N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956). See generally 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING § 20.01[2] (1987) [hereinafter A. RATHKOPF]; 3A N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, §
77.02.
8. See D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 1.3 (1982).
9. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974); infra text accompanying
notes 26-28.
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Concurrent with the growing municipal desire to establish and
preserve residential communities has been the emergence of the
modern church as a multi-purpose facility 'that serves a variety of
functions. Churches no longer meet only for worship on a limited
basis or serve only those in the immediate vicinity. The increased
mobility of our society has changed the membership composition of
churches, and people frequently travel great distances to attend a
particular church.'I More significantly, churches today often engage
in a variety of activities throughout the week that range from traditional functions, such as worship and study, to various social and
educational ministries. I"As a result, churches are more intense land
users than their predecessors and are viewed with growing frequency
as incompatible with residential surroundings.
Sensitive to these changes, courts are beginning to respond more
favorably to church zoning restrictions, especially those which exclude churches from residential neighborhoods. In particular, lower
federal courts that have begun to address church zoning issues have
adopted an approach which allows substantial restrictions on church
land uses. 2 In so doing, these federal decisions have shown varying
sensitivity to the first amendment concerns implicit in regulating
religious exercise. In perhaps, the leading and most controversial
federal church zoning decision, Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of
Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood,'3 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals applied a "mere rationality" standard of review
and upheld a zoning ordinance that excluded churches from ninety
percent of a residential community."
The changing judicial attitude toward church zoning is accompanied by the emergence of several new issues in the religious land

10.
11.

See 2 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, § 20.01.
See Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with

Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347, 367 (1984); see also 2 A. RATHKOPF,
supra note 7, § 20.01; 3A N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 77.01.
12. See First Assembly of God v. City of Alexandria, 739 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

469 U.S. 1019 (1984); Shuster v. City of Hollywood, 725 F2d 693 (11th Cir. 1984); Grosz
v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984);

Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d
303, (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); Congregation Beth Yitzchok of Rockland,
Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
13. 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
14. Id. at 308; see infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text. The Lakewood decision has
generated a significant amount of commentary, all of it critical. See Comment, Zoning Ordinances Affecting Churches: A Proposalfor Expanded Free Exercise Protection, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1131 (1984); Note, Land Use Regulation And The Exercise Clause, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1562 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Land Use Regulation]; Note, Justice Douglas; Sanctuary: May
Churches Be Excluded From Suburban Residential Areas?, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017 (1984)
[hereinafter Note, Justice Douglas' Sanctuary].
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use zoning context. The central concern surrounding church zoning
has been and still remains locational restrictions on conventional
church buildings, both in terms of blanket exclusions from residential neighborhoods and special-use permit requirements. As suggested by Lakewood, however, a related issue of growing
significance, due to the emergence of communities that are exclusively residential, is to what extent churches may be limited within a
municipality. This concern is particularly significant in suburban
areas where entire towns might be dedicated to residential use.
A second emerging issue in church zoning concerns the types of
secondary activities that can be conducted on church premises. Of
particular importance in the last several years is whether a church
may operate a private religious school or day care center on its property. In the last decade there has been tremendous growth in the
number of private religious schools in the United States. This growth
is primarily attributable to a growing dissatisfaction by conservative
religious groups with public education.' 5 Due to financial restraints,
most of these new religious schools are housed in churches, and yet
are often regulated by separate zoning and building codes. A result
has been a burgeoning area of case law in the last several years, with
inevitably much more to follow.' 6
A third emerging issue is the extent to which church zoning ordinances can be used to limit religious assembly in private homes.
Several recent appellate decisions have addressed the issue with
regard to formal religious services held in private homes. ' 7 Further,
15.

See Solorzano, In New Christian Schools, Jesus is the Teacher, U.S. NEWS& WORLD

REP., Mar. 5, 1984, at 46.

16. See First Assembly of God v. City of Alexandria, 739 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1984);
Congregation Beth Yitzchok v. Rockland, Inc. v. Town of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982); Abram
v. City of Fayetteville, 281 Ark. 63, 661 S.W.2d 371 (1983); State ex rel. Pringle v. Heritage
Baptist Temple, Inc., 236 Kan. 544, 693 P.2d 1163 (1985); City of Concord v. New Testament
Baptist Church, 118 N.H. 56, 382 A.2d 377 (1978); City of Las Cruces v. Huerta, 102 N.M.
182, 692 P.2d 1331 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 693 P.2d 591 (1984); North Shore Hebrew
Academy v. Wegman, 105 A.D.2d 702, 481 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1984); Medford Assembly of God
v. City of Medford, 72 Or. App. 333, 695 P.2d 1379, review denied, 299 Or. 203, 700 P.2d
251, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 570 (1985); Damascus Community Church v. Clackamus County,
45 Or. App. 1065, 610 P.2d 273 (1980), appealdismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981); State v.Corpus
Christi People's Baptist Church, Inc., 683 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. 1984), appeal dismissed, 106 S.
Ct. 32 (1985); City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church of Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d
1358 (1982).
17. Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
827 (1984) (Orthodox rabbi prohibited from conducting services twice daily in home with up to
fifty people attending); State v. Cameron, 184 N.J. Super. 66, 445 A.2d 75 (1982), aff'd, 189
N.J. Super. 404, 460 A.2d 191 (App. Div. 1983) (Episcopalian clergyman prohibited from
holding Sunday morning worship services in his home), rev'd, 100 N.J. 586, 498 A.2d 1217
(1985).
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religious organizations have reported numerous attempts by
municipalities to apply zoning ordinances to prohibit more informal
religious gatherings such as home Bible studies or prayer groups.'"
These incidents, although not yet generating any case law, suggest
the need for a clear understanding of a municipality's ability to
regulate religious activities in private homes.
This article will attempt a comprehensive review and analysis of
the church zoning issues outlined above. The general thesis of this
article is that, although churches can be made subject to zoning ordinances and other forms of land use controls, Supreme Court precedent indicates that the Constitution requires application of the intermediate level of review to ordinances regulating churches, rather than
the "mere rationality" standard normally applied to zoning ordinances. This intermediate level of review was recently applied by
the Court in cases involving zoning of protected speech. It was
developed with regard to time, place and manner restrictions on expressive activity and focuses on content-neutrality, precision of regulation, and available alternatives for exercise of the restricted right.
As applied, this intermediate level of review suggests that the traditional position in the majority of states that zoning ordinances cannot exclude churches from residential areas is unwarranted. At the
same time, the "mere rationality" approach of Lakewood fails to
provide sufficient scrutiny of zoning restrictions on churches.
The article will first discuss principles and judicial attitudes
toward church zoning. Part two will discuss first amendment considerations in church zoning, examining the scope of free exercise
protection, time, place, and manner restrictions, and zoning restrictions on first amendment conduct. Part three of the article will then
apply that analysis to locational restrictions on churches, examining
both blanket exclusions from residential districts and the regulation
of church location through special use permits. Part four will examine the permissible scope of accessory activities a church can conduct
on its property, with special attention to the question of church
schools. Finally, part five will discuss the regulation of religious activities in the home.

18. The Center for Law and Religious Freedom has reported over one hundred such incidents over the last several years. See Center for Law and Religious Freedom, 12 BRIEFLY 3
(1983); see also Comment, Zoning Ordinances, Private Religious Conduct, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 786 (1981) (listing five such incidents).
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ZONING CHURCHES

A.

Zoning in General
Zoning is a relatively recent phenomenon. Often viewed as an
outgrowth of the law of nuisance, it developed in the early part of
this century as a more elaborate means of regulating land and insuring compatibility of uses.I9 Whereas nuisance doctrine assesses compatibility on a case-by-case basis, zoning is premised on a speculative
classification system that separates land uses based on generalizations made regarding those uses. Zoning ordinances typically divide
a municipality into various districts. Ordinarily, the primary
classifications separate residential, commercial, and industrial uses.
These general classifications are then further divided into a number
of gradations, with low density residential zones as the highest or
most important use.20 Besides segregating categories of land uses,
zoning further regulates the individual use of land within each
district through density and site development controls, such as setback, sideyard, bulk, area, and height requirements."
By its very nature, therefore, zoning tolerates imprecision. That is,
it does not regulate land based on the actual external effects
generated by a particular use, but upon generalizations about the
anticipated impact of that type of use. This inevitably results in some
imprecision, since a particular use might be more or less compatible
with its surroundings than is normal for that category of use. For example, the effects generated by a small commercial enterprise might
actually be less than those accompanying a large single family dwelling, yet zoning ordinances typically will exclude commercial uses
from residential districts. The administrative advantages of using a
speculative classification system are deemed to outweigh the
resulting imprecision.
Although controversial at first, the constitutionality of zoning was
established in 1926 in the seminal decision of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,22 Euclid involved a challenge to a comprehensive zoning ordinance in its totality, alleging that the restrictions imposed on the claimant's land violated substantive due process. The
Court viewed zoning as a form of economic and social legislation
and stated that a zoning ordinance would be unconstitutional only
if it was "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 3
19. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 8, § 1.3.
20. Id. § 5.1.
21.

Id.

22. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
23. Id. at 395.
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The Court found that the various segregation of uses at issue in Euclid,
such as low density residential homes from apartments, was a
reasonable means of serving legitimate state interests, such as noise
and traffic reduction, and, therefore, it upheld the ordinance.2 '
Although the Court recognized that the ordinance was overinclusive
because some harmless activities would necessarily be restricted, it
stated that a reasonable margin of error was necessary for effective
enforcement and would not render the legislation invalid.25
The Court recently affirmed this deferential approach to zoning
established in Euclid in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.2 6 In Belle
Terre, the Court reviewed an ordinance that prohibited more than
two unrelated adults from living in the same household. After noting
that the ordinance did not implicate any fundamental liberties, the
Court applied a mere rationality standard of review, stating that a
zoning restriction will be upheld as long as it "bears a rational relationship to a [permissible] state objective." 2 7 Significantly, the Court
recognized the preservation of quiet residential neighborhoods as an
important value served by zoning restrictions, stating:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles
restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family
needs .... The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench,

and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the
area a sanctuary for people. 2

Shortly after Belle Terre, however, the Court established, in a series
of decisions, that the normal deference afforded zoning legislation
does not apply when fundamental rights are implicated. On
facts similar to Belle Terre, the Court, in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland,29 invalidated a zoning ordinance which restricted living ar24. Id. at 394-95.
25.

Id. at 388-89.

26. 416 U.S. I (1974).
27. Id. at 8 (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
28. Id. at 9. The Court most recently applied the mere rationality standard to invalidate a
zoning ordinance in City of Cleburne v.Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985), suggesting that the standard is not completely deferential. In Cleburne, the Court held that an ordinance which required a special use permit for a group home for the mentally handicapped
but not for boarding houses, homes for the aged, or fraternities was not rationally related to a
legitimate government interest and thus invalid. The Court declined to apply heightened
scrutiny, stating that the mentally handicapped do not qualify as a suspect or quasi-suspect
class. Id. at 3258. The Court proceeded to find, however, that the restriction failed even
minimal scrutiny, stating that there was no legitimate distinction between the Cleburne Living
Center and permitted uses involving group living situations. The Court concluded that the
special permit restriction on the mentally handicapped was based on irrational prejudice rather
than legitimate government interests. Id. at 3259-60.
29. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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rangements to a narrowly defined class of relatives and thereby prohibited a woman from living with her grandson.3" Justice Powell's

plurality opinion characterized the ordinance as one "slicing deeply
into the family itself," 3 ' thus requiring greater scrutiny than normally applied to zoning legislation. The fundamental nature of the right
to familial relationships required that the Court "examine carefully

the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the challenged regulation." 3 Apply-

ing this "greater scrutiny," the plurality found the ordinance invalid because it only marginally served the city's purported interests

in preventing overcrowding, minimizing parking and traffic congestion, and avoiding undue financial burdens on the city.33
More importantly for issues of church zoning, the Court has
recently examined zoning ordinances that affect first amendment activities. The Court, in a series of opinions, has stated that, although
zoning restrictions can regulate land uses involving the first amendment, a higher standard of scrutiny applies in such situations."'
These decisions will be examined in part two of this article.
B.

JudicialAttitudes Toward Church Zoning
Municipalities inevitably address churches, like other land users,

in comprehensive zoning schemes. Although municipalities can
make churches subject to a variety of zoning regulations," restrictions on their location are the most basic method and have generated
the most caselaw. The two primary issues concerning locational

30. East Cleveland's zoning ordinance limited occupancy of dwelling units to members of
a single family. It narrowly defined family, however, to include only a few categories of
related individuals. Mrs. Moore lived with her son and two grandsons, who were cousins
rather than, brothers. The ordinance did not define family to include cousins, and thus Mrs.
Moore's living arrangement violated the ordinance. Id. at 495-96.
31. Id. at 498.
32. Id. at 499.
33. Id. at 500. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion was necessary to form a majority in
Moore. Justice Stevens applied the mere rationality standard but found the ordinance invalid,
stating that the ordinance had not been shown to further the public welfare. Despite couching
his analysis in mere rationality language, Justice Stevens applied a sliding scale approach,
since a factor in finding the ordinance unconstitutional was that it "cuts so deeply into a fundamental right normally associated with the ownership of residential property." Id. at 520.
520.
34. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986); Schad v.
Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976).
35. In addition to location restrictions, churches can be made subject to site development
restrictions, such as setback and sideyard requirements, and restrictions on accessory uses. See
3A N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, §§ 77.-19 (rev. ed. 1985).
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restrictions on churches are whether churches can be excluded
altogether from residential neighborhoods, and the manner in which
the special-use permit process can be used to regulate church location.
Although the need for churches and the services they provide
might at times favor their inclusion in residential neighborhoods, 36
a number of undesirable byproducts of churches may justify their
exclusion. Most significant among these negative byproducts is the
increased traffic and its accompanying safety and parking problems.
A second significant concern is the noise generated by church activities. Finally, churches in residential districts frequently have negative
fiscal effects on neighborhoods, both because of the reduced property values of land immediately surrounding churches and the decreas37
ed tax base caused by the property tax exemption given to churches.
Municipalities have responded to these concerns in several ways.
Some critics, perceiving that the benefits from churches outweigh
their harms, allow churches as of right in residential districts.3 8
Policy makers in these cities believe that the negative effects of
churches in such situations are sufficiently controlled by site
development requirements, such as sideyard and setback restrictions
and parking requirements. More often, however, municipalities provide for locational restrictions on churches in one of two ways. First,
municipalities frequently exclude churches from low density residential neighborhoods, locating them instead in higher-density residential districts or in commercial zones. 39 A second approach allows
churches to locate in residential neighborhoods subject to special-use
permits. This approach requires that a church first meet certain
criteria, usually designed in part to ensure that the church is compatible with surrounding property uses, before it is allowed to locate in
a residential zone. 0
State courts have responded to these locational restrictions in
several ways. The "majority position" is that a blanket exclusion of
churches from a residential district is invalid.' Although as many as

36. In assessing a proper zoning classification for a church, a municipality might consider
a number of factors, including the needs of churches, the services they provide for a particular
community, and their perceived compatibility with surrounding land. See generally id. § 77.01.
37. Id. See generally J. CURRY, PUBLIC REGULATION OF THE RELIGIOUS USE OF LAND
71-134 (1964).
38. See 2 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, § 20.01[1].
39. See generally 3A N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 77.02 (rev. ed. 1985).
40. See 2 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, § 20.01[4].
41. See 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 12.22 (3d ed. 1986); 8 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.131 (3d ed. 1983); 2 A. RATHKOPF,
supra note 7, § 20.01[2][a]; 3A N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1, § 77.02 (rev. ed. 1985).
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eleven states might be placed in this category, 2 commentators have
noted that many of these court decisions can be explained on other
grounds and that some of the decisions purported to follow the "majority position" only discussed the question in dictum."3 Indeed,
many majority decisions do not necessarily reflect the absolutism
regarding churches' immunity from residential restrictions often attributed to them.
Nevertheless, a substantial majority of state courts that have
discussed the exclusion issue in some fashion have either directly
held, or employed reasoning to the effect, that any complete exclusion of churches from residential districts is invalid. 5 The primary
rationale for invalidating such exclusions has not stemmed from concern with freedom of religion, but rather from a due process analysis

which concludes that such exclusions are arbitrary. and capricious
and fail to promote the public health, safety, morals or welfare.

6 In

so holding, courts have reasoned that churches, by their very nature,
are "clearly in furtherance of the public morals and general
welfare," often emphasizing the moral guidance they provide to
communities. 7 Despite this frequent emphasis on substantive due
process analysis, a close reading of these decisions suggests that
42. See Ellsworth v. Gercke, 62 Ariz. 198, 202, 156 P.2d 242, 244 (1945); City of
Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 146 Colo. 374, 380, 362 P.2d 172, 175 (1961); Rogers
v. Mayor of Atlanta, 110 Ga. App. 114, 116, 137 S.E.2d 668, 671 (1964); State v. Maxwell,
62 Haw. 556, 561-62, 617 P.2d 816, 820 (1980) (dictum); Church of Christ v. Metropolitan
Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 175 Ind. App. 346, 349-50, 371 N.E.2d 1331, 1333-34 (1978); Reeves
v. North Shreve Baptist Church, 163 So. 2d 458, 463 (La. App. 1964) (dictum); Congregation
Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451, 454-55 (Mo. 1959) (interpreting state
enabling statute as prohibiting exclusion of churches); State ex rel. Roman Catholic Bishop
v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231, 245-46, 90 P.2d 217, 222 (1939); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd.,
1 N.Y.2d 508, 522, 136 N.E.2d 827, 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 858-59 (1956); State ex rel. Synod
v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 249-50, 39 N.E.2d 515, 524 (1942) (dictum); City of Sherman
v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 119-20, 183 S.W.2d 415, 417 (1944). In addition to the above states,
Massachusetts by statute prohibits the exclusion of churches from residential districts. See MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 40A, § 3 (1979).
43. See J. CURRY, supra note 37, at 24-25; Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police
Power Versus The First Amendment, 64 B.U.L. REV. 767, 776-77 (1984).
44. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Gercke, 62 Ariz. 198, 156 P.2d 242 (1945) (invalidating ordinance which excluded churches but allowed other types of public land uses such as hospitals and
schools); Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959) (interpreting state enabling statute as prohibiting exclusion of churches).
45. See cases cited supra note 2.
46. See, e.g., Apostolic Christian Church, 146 Colo. at 380, 362 P.2d at 175; Simms,
143 Tex. at 119-20, 183 SW.2d at 417. See generally 2 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, §
20.01 [2][a].
47. See Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 524, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154
N.Y.S.2d 849, 861 (1956); State exrel. Synod v. Jopseh, 139 Ohio St. 229, 249-50, 39 N.E.2d
515, 524 (1942); Congregation Comm. of Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City
Council, 287 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
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religious freedom has also been involved in the courts' reasoning"8
and has occasionally been articulated as a primary reason for invalidating locational restrictions. 49
The degree of protection afforded churches under the majority
position varies considerably, however." Although most jurisdictions
prohibit the complete exclusion of churches,

they do allow

reasonable site development regulations, such as setback and sideyard
restrictions, that are designed to alleviate the adverse effects of
churches. 5' Further, most majority states allow municipalities to
subject churches to special-use permit requirements.52 These states

closely scrutinize permit denials, however, to ensure that the denial
was necessitated by the facts of the case."
In contrast to the majority view, the "minority position" provides
that municipalities can completely exclude churches from residential
districts without violating either their right to substantive due pro48. Commentators have frequently stated that the prohibition against church exclusions
is based on substantive due process and not freedom of religion concerns. See, e.g., 2 A.
RATHKOPF, supra note 7, § 20.01. Although this has certainly been the primary emphasis in
most cases, and in particular earlier decisions, courts have also expressed concern about the
burden on freedom of religion. See, e.g., Rogers v. Mayor of Atlanta, 110 Ga. App. 114,
116, 137 S.E.2d 668, 671 (1964); State v. Maxwell, 62 Haw. 556, 561-62, 617 P.2d 816, 820
(1980); Congregation Temple Israel, 320 S.W.2d at 455; Simms, 143 Tex. at 119-20, 183
S.W.2d at 416-17.
49. See Church of Christ v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning, 175 Ind. App. 346, 349-50, 371
N.E.2d 1331, 1333-34 (1978); Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of the North Shore, Inc. v.
Incorporated Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 287, 342 N.E.2d 534, 538, 379
N.Y.S.2d 747, 752 (1975).
50. The most extreme majority state position is that taken by New York courts, which
have long closely scrutinized any zoning restrictions on churches. New York decisions have not
only rejected church exclusions from residential districts, see, e.g., Diocese of Rochester, 1
N.Y.2d at 525-26, 136 N.E.2d at 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62, but have also scrutinized even such
basic zoning requirements as setback requirements. See Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue
of the North Shore, Inc. v. Incorporated VIllage of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 342 N.E.2d
534, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1975). For a view that New York's extreme protectionist approach
violates the establishment clause, see Reynolds, supra note 43, at 790-95.
51. See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v.Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233
Ind. 83, 89, 117 N.E.2d 115, 118 (1954) (setback requirements permissible); Rogers v.
Mayor of Atlanta, 110 Ga. App. 114, 116, 137 S.E.2d 668, 671 (1964); City of Sherman v.
Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 119-20, 183 S.W.2d 415, 417 (1944).
52. See, e.g., Rogers, 110 Ga. App. at 116, 137 S.E.2d at 671; State v. Maxwell, 62 Haw.
556, 562, 617 P.2d 816, 820 (1980); State ex rel. Synod v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 241-42,
39 N.E.2d 515, 521 (1942); Congregation Comm. of Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses
v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). Of course, those states
recognizing that churches might be completely excluded from residential neighborhoods also
recognize the validity of the special-use permit process as applied to churches. See, e.g.,
Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Or. 281, 313, 330 P.2d 5, 20 (1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 436 (1959).
53. This is most clearly seen with regard to permit denials based on traffic concerns.
Although at times upholding such denials, courts have frequently struck down special-use
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cess or freedom of religion." As with the majority position, the states
following the minority position defy rigid categorization," with

some decisions applying a balancing test which gives some consideration to burdens on religious freedom. 6 Broadly speaking, however,
these decisions represent the view that the secondary effects
generated by churches, such as noise, parking, and traffic concerns,

justify their exclusion from residential districts. This deferential
standard has even been applied to permit exclusion of churches from
low density residential neighborhoods when other uses such as parks,
libraries, and museums have been allowed.5 7

As noted above, federal courts have only recently begun to address religious land use zoning. In doing so, they have consistently

followed the minority approach and have held that churches can' be
made subject to reasonable zoning restrictions, including exclusion
from residential neighborhoods. 5 8 The leading federal case is
Lakewood, Ohio Congregationof Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City

of Lakewood." In this case, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
denials ostensibly based on traffic concerns because a close examination of the facts
demonstrated that traffic would not be a problem. In doing so, courts have focused on specific
facts such as the size of the congregation, width of the street, and current levels of traffic. See,
e.g., Rogers, 110 Ga. App. at 116-20, 137 S.E.2d at 671-72; Diocese of Rochester v. Planning
at 524-25, 136 N.E.2d at 834-36, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 860-61; Joseph, 139 Ohio St. at 247-48,
39 N.E.2d at 523-24.
54. See 2 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, § 20.01; 3A N. WILLIAMS, supra note 1,§ 77.03.
55. The minority position is most frequently associated with California, which first
established that churches could be excluded from residential neighborhoods in Corporation of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal.
App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823, appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949), reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 939
(1950). The minority position has also been adopted in Florida, see Miami Beach United
Lutheran Church v. City of Miami, 82 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1955); New Jersey, see State v.
Cameron, 189 N.J. Super. 404, 460 A.2d 191 (App. Div. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 100
N.J. 586, 498 A.2d 1217 (1985); Oregon,see Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen,
241 Or. 281, 330 P.2d 5 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 436 (1959); and possibly Wisconsin, see
State ex rel. Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Village Bd. of Trustees, 12 Wis. 2d 585, 108
N.W.2d 288, 299 (1961) (stating that ordinance which excludes churches from residential
districts
must pass balancing test,
implying that the ordinance isnot per se invalid). Although
not necessarily adopting the minority position, language or reasoning in opinions from several
other states suggests sympathy with the minority position. See West Hartford Methodist
Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956); Columbus Park Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Board of Appeals, 25 Ill. 2d 65, 182 N.E.2d 722 (1962);
Mooney v. Village of Orchard Beach, 333 Mich. 389, 53 N.W.2d 308 (1952).
56. See Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958), appeal
dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959); State v. Cameron, 184 N.J. Super. 66, 445 A.2d 75 (1982),
aff'd, 189 N.J. Super. 404, 460 A.2d 191 (App. Div. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 100 N.J.
586, 498 A.2d 1217 (1985); State ex rel. Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Village Bd. of Trustees,
12 Wis. 2d 585, 108 N.W.2d 288 (1961).
57. Minney, 164 Cal. App. 2d at 24, 330 P.2d at 261.
58. See supra note 12.
59. 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
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upheld a zoning ordinance that excluded churches from ninety percent of a municipality and required issuance of a special-use permit
in the remaining ten percent. The court employed a two-part analysis
to resolve the case. It first examined whether the restriction violated
the free exercise right of the congregation and held that since the ordinance only regulated church location, an essentially secular consideration, there was no violation."' It then proceeded to test the
restriction under the mere rationality standard and concluded that
the ordinance was valid since it furthered a legitimate state interest
of insulating residential neighborhoods from the traffic, parking,
and noise accompanying churches."
The emerging federal case law, along with the minority state position, reflects a clear rejection of the majority due process analysis,
which insulates churches from zoning restrictions because of their
perceived benefits to society. This rejection is well-warranted. The
majority's due process analysis is problematic in several regards.
First, to the extent that it relies on the normally deferential arbitrary and capricious standard to strike down church exclusion
from residential neighborhoods, it ignores several legitimate'state interests sufficient to support zoning, most notably the traffic, noise,
and parking problems generated by churches. The Supreme Court in
Belle Terre recognized the important interest municipalities have in
preserving the "quiet seclusion" of residential neighborhoods;6 2
church exclusion -from residential neighborhoods is rationally related
to that interest.
A second and more fundamental problem with the majority due
process approach is that it is an implicit balancing of interests that
necessarily involves judicial perceptions of the benefits derived from
churches. Although the consideration of a particular use's benefits
to a community can and should be relevant in a city's initial zoning
determination, judicial review of zoning restrictions typically focuses
on the adverse, external effects of excluded uses rather than the
benefits derived from such uses.6 3 This is because substantive due
process only requires that the legislation be related to some
legitimate governmental objective, not that it be the best course of

60. Id. at 306-08.
61. Id. at 308.
62. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1974).
63. See, e.g., id., where the Supreme Court justified a prohibition on more than
two unrelated adults living in the same household by examining the negative, external effects
to be avoided by such a regulation. The Court saw this in the greater traffic and noise
generated by multiple living arrangements. Id. at 9. See Reynolds, supra note 43, at 782-83 n.89.
n.89.
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action. Therefore, if the external effects generated by a particular
use justify its restriction, that is enough to meet the minimal scrutiny
applied regardless of the perceived benefits of the regulated activity.
The emerging federal case law, together with the minority state
position, is correct in rejecting substantive due process as a basis for
insulating churches from zoning restrictions. To the extent that special
consideration should be given to churches when reviewing zoning
restrictions, it should be premised on free exercise concerns. The exact extent to which the first amendment insulates churches from zoning restrictions, however, is unclear. Although some courts have been
willing to balance religious councerns against zoning values in reaching
decisions,6 4 other courts have assumed that the only alternative to
substantive due process was mere rationality. Lakewood is particularly
troublesome because the court applied only the deferential due process standard of review in examining an ordinance which came close
to totally excluding churches from a municipality.
This failure to recognize the requirements of the free exercise
clause might be attributable, in part, to the Supreme Court's rather
limited, and at times confusing, treatment of the clause. The Court
has made clear in other contexts, however, that when zoning ordinances implicate fundamental liberties, such as free speech, the normal deference afforded zoning does not apply. 65 This same analysis
should apply when zoning restricts religious exercise. As the next section will demonstrate, this rejection of the mere rationality standard
does not preclude locational restrictions on churches, but does require that greater scrutiny be applied than is normal.
The next section of the article will examine the correct standard to
be applied in analyzing zoning restrictions on churches. It will first
examine the free exercise clause and its application to church zoning.
It will then discuss the Court's treatment of time, place, and manner
restrictions, specifically examining its application in the zoning context.

II.

FIRST AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK

A.

Free Exercise Clause

Churches frequently invoke the free exercise clause of the first
66
amendment to challenge zoning restrictions on religious land uses.
64.

See supra note 56.

65. See supra text accompanying notes.29-33; infra text accompanying notes 126-45.
66. See, e.g., Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 305 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); Milwaukie Co. of
Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Or. 281, 313-14, 330 P.2d 5, 20 (1958).
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Recent commentary has also argued in favor of its use to prohibit the
blanket exclusions of churches from residential areas.6 7 Yet, courts
have demonstrated significant difficulty in relating free exercise
jurisprudence to church zoning restrictions.
This difficulty results, in part, from the limited factual context in
which free exercise analysis has developed. Current free exercise
analysis provides for strict scrutiny when a state action substantially
burdens a belief "rooted in religion." 6 The substantial burden requirement, however, has been construed in only two contexts: where
a direct governmental action prohibits religious conduct, and where
the receipt of important government benefits is conditioned on foregoing a religious belief.69 Because of the narrow factual context in which
claims have been addressed, the Court has not clearly articulated the
nature of the burden that will give rise to a free exercise infringement.
Prior to 1963, the Supreme Court gave little independent
substance to the free exercise clause as a source of protection for
religious freedom. 70 Although the Court had frequently protected
religious exercise, that protection was usually grounded in other constitutional guarantees, most notably the right to free speech." In
Sherbert v. Verner,72 however, the Court for the first time gave an
expanded reading to the protections provided by the free exercise
clause. In Sherbert, the Court reviewed a South Carolina statute that
denied unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist because
she refused to work on Saturday due to her religious beliefs.7 3 In

67. See Comment, supra note 14, at 1143-49; Note, Justice Douglas' Sanctuary, supra
note 14, at 1034-35.
68. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713-14 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
69. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
70. Perhaps the leading decision of this era was Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961),
in which the Court rejected the claim that Sunday closing laws violated the free exercise rights
of Orthodox Jews whose religious beliefs required them also to close on Saturdays. Justice
Warren's plurality opinion acknowledged that the law potentially had a substantial adverse
economic effect on Jewish merchants, but viewed the burden as only indirect, emphasizing
that the legislation only made the exercise of religion more expensive but did not prohibit it.
Id. at 605-06. Although Brounfeld is difficult to reconcile with subsequent free exercise cases,
the Court has never overruled it, suggesting that financial burdens in and of themselves do not
necessarily infringe free exercise rights. See infra note 90.
71. For a discussion of the manner in which the free speech clause has been used to protect religious exercise, see infra text accompanying notes 94-107.
72. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
73. Id. at 400-02.
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finding the denial of benefits unconstitutional, the Court revealed a
two step analysis for resolving free exercise questions. First, a court
must determine whether the government is in fact infringing upon
free exercise rights of the claimant."4 Second, if such rights are in
fact infringed upon, the state must justify the infringement by a compelling interest in the least restrictive means possible.75
In finding that the denial of benefits in Sherbert did in fact infringe upon the claimant's free exercise rights, the Court focused on
the coercive effect this denial placed on the claimant to abandon a cardinal tenet of her religion. Although the Court noted that there were
no criminal sanctions directly compelling the claimant to forego the
religion," suggesting that she, in effect, was being penalized for her
ween following her religious beliefs and obtaining government
benefits.76 Importantly, the Court emphasized that the claimant's ineligibility for benefits derived "solely from the practice of her
religion," suggesting that she, in effect, was being penalized for her
religious beliefs. This forced choice placed the same kind of burden
on her beliefs as a direct prohibition and, therefore, upon the
claimant's free exercise rights.78 The state failed to establish a compelling interest sufficient to justify this infringement since the state's
interest could still be met by creating an exemption for
Sabbatarians."
The principles enunciated in Sherbert were further refined in
Wisconsin v. Yoder" and Thomas v. Review Board.8 In these cases,
the Court again stated that a free exercise violation was contingent
on state action that substantially burdened a belief rooted in
religion.82 In Yoder, the Court found such an infringement in
Wisconsin's compulsory education law, which contravened the
Amish religion's belief against high school education. The Court
noted that the law substantially burdened the Amish's belief by forcing them to abandon it or move elsewhere.83 The Court applied a
similar analysis in Thomas, where it held that the denial of
unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness, who quit his job

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 403.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 403-04.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 403-04.
Id. at 407-09.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
450 U.S. at 714-15; 406 U.S. at 215-16.
406 U.S. at 218.
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because of religious convictions, violated his free exercise rights.",
The Court in finding a free exercise infringement, again emphasized
the law's coercive effect upon the claimant's religious beliefs and"
stated:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and violate his beliefs, a burden
upon religion exists."

The Sherbert line of cases demonstrates the narrow factual setting
in which free exercise infringements have been found.87 Strict
judicial scrutiny in each case was required because of the state's
coercion of the abandonment of a mandated religious belief or practice. In Yoder, the coercion was by direct prohibition of the practice,
while in Sherbert and Thomas, the state indirectly coerced abandonment by conditioning receipt of important governmental benefits
upon actions contrary to the claimants' religion. In both settings,
however, the Court stressed the substantial pressure on the adherent
to abandon or modify religious beliefs.
The coercion necessary to trigger strict scrutiny is obvious in the
case of a direct prohibition; the claimant is forced to choose between
religious beliefs and obeying the law. The coercion inherent in conditioning receipt of governmental benefits is not as readily apparent
since it effectively amounts to a financial burden, which the Court
prior to Sherbert had recognized as in itself not sufficient to trigger
84. 450 U.S. at 714-15.
85. The Court in Thomas apparently expanded free exercise protection to cover not only
core tenets of established religions but any sincerely held religious belief. Id. at 714-15. In both
Sherbert and Yoder, the Court stressed the central role the burdened belief played in the
adherent's religion. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("cardinal principle"); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 ("basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith"). The
emphasis on centrality in those decisions, however, was made in the context of establishing
sincerity and thus is not necessarily inconsistent with the more expansive language in Thomas.
86. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.

87. The Supreme Court's free exercise analysis as articulated in Sherbert, Yoder, and
Thomas is best viewed as a two-tiered form of definitional balancing, since a threshold showing of coercive effect upon a mandated belief is necessary to trigger strict judicial scrutiny.
This strict scrutiny, however, appears to contain an element of balancing once an infringement is established, since the state's interest in not granting an exemption is weighed
against the burden on religion. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221. Language in Yoder and the
court's later decision in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), however, suggests an even

more open balancing approach in which burdens on religion would be weighed against the
state's interest. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 ("a State's interest in universal education, however
highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental
rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
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strict scrutiny. 8 Arguably, though, conditioning benefits penalizes

the religious adherent for his or her beliefs, since it is the religious
belief which uniquely disqualifies the adherent from the benefit.89

As such, it substantially coerces abandonment of the belief and
enocurages conformance to societal norms. This should be con-

trasted to the inevitable costs attendant to broad regulatory programs, in which case the costs are not uniquely attributable to
religious doctrine and thus do not coerce abandonment of beliefs. 9

This analysis suggests that zoning restrictions that exclude
churches from residential districts or subject them to the special-use
permit process do not infringe upon free exercise rights as developed

in Sherbert, Yoder, and Thomas. Under those cases, state action must
be assessed in terms of the coercive effect it has upon a mandated
religious belief. Although locating a church on a particular site might
be viewed as a religiously motivated decision, rarely will church location be mandated. Rather, it involves a secular choice regarding how
to pursue the central belief of religious worship and assembly.
Religious worship, of course, might be burdened by locational restrictions in several significant ways: by the increased financial costs in

obtaining alternative sites, the inconvenience to religious adherents
because of less accessible churches, and because of less conducive
surroundings. Yet, none of these burdens necessarily coerce abandon-

ment of religious worship itself. Religious adherents still have the opAmendment"); Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58 ("The state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.").
88. In its earlier decision in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), both the plurality
and concurring opinions stated that financial burdens in and of themselves do not necessarily
constitute a free exercise infringement. See id. at 605-06 (plurality opinion); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 521-22 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring also applying to Braunfeld).
The Court emphasized in Sherbert that it was not overruling Braunfeld. Sherbert, 374 U.S.
at 408-09.
89. In both Sherbert and Thomas the Court emphasized that the religious claimant's "ineligibility for benefits derive[d] solely from the practice of her religion." 374 U.S. at 404; 450
U.S. at 717.
90. Implicit in holding that religious conduct is subject to reasonable state regulations is
that there will often be some attendant costs in order to comply with such regulations. For instance, the Court's dictum in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971), that building and
zoning regulations are permissible forms of government regulation of churches necessarily
recognizes that such regulations will impose costs on churches. Similarly, state regulation of
religious education, which the Court has viewed as permissible, see, e.g., Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247 (1968), necessarily involves increased costs. The Court has never suggested that these costs infringe upon free exercise rights. Indeed, the Court recently suggested
in a first amendment zoning context that zoning's economic impact on first amendment activity is
irrelevant. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 932 (1986) ("The inquiry for First Amendment purposes is not concerned with economic impact.") (quoting
Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35 (1976)).
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tion to worship in other locations, albeit with some greater difficulty
and increased expense.
Importantly, such burdens are not uniquely attributable to the
adherents' religious beliefs. Rather, they are commonly shared by all
regulated land uses. As such, the religious adherent burdened by a
church zoning ordinance is not penalized for religious beliefs in the
same way as the claimants in Sherbert and Thomas. Instead, the
burden on religion is best viewed as the inevitable consequence of
government regulation from which religion is not immune. 91
The absence of a Sherbert-style free exercise infringement, however,
should not automatically legitimize government regulation. The
regulation of first amendment activity, including religious exercise,
requires justification independent of its coercive burden on
exercise. 92 Such protection, with its genesis in free speech, requires
that government regulations on the time, place and manner of first
amendment exercise must meet what has often been described as an
intermediate level of review. This form of scrutiny recognizes the
legitimacy of such regulations despite their consequential burdens,
but requires that they be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternatives9 3
for exercise of the right.
For this reason, Lakewood and other decisions that treat church
zoning no differently than any other zoning are troublesome.
Although in most situations an intermediate level of review will not
invalidate church zoning, such a standard does require added constitutional inquiries too often ignored by courts such as the Sixth
Circuit panel in Lakewood. The next subsection of this article will
establish the relevancy of this standard of review to church zoning.
B.

Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Religious Conduct

The limited scope of free exercise analysis heretofore is due, at
least in part, to the Supreme Court's propensity to decide cases involving religious exercise on free speech, rather than free exercise,
grounds.9 " Analysis of government restrictions on affirmative religious
conduct, as opposed to acts of conscience, has consistently occurred
within the framework of the free speech clause because of the expressive nature that such conduct takes. This does not preclude extending
91. See supra note 90.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 94-145.
93. See infra note 124.
94. For a general discussion of the Court's reliance on the free speech clause as a means
of protecting religious exercise, see Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983).
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free exercise protection to affirmative expressive religious conduct,9"

but does suggest that the extension of free exercise protection to such
conduct should parallel the protection afforded similar conduct under
the free speech clause.

The application of first amendment protection to religiously
motivated activity via the free speech clause began long before
Sherbert; it finds its genesis in the public forum cases of the 1930s
and 1940s. 9 6 These early cases involved religious activities, such as

proselytizing, the sale of religious literature, and preaching,9" and
addressed the permissibility of time, place, and manner restrictions
on, rather than the outright prohibition of, expressive conduct. The
level of protection developed for this type of religious conduct,

therefore, did not involve strict scrutiny but instead an intermediate
level of review.
Although the Court acknowledged that expressive activities can be
made subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, it
noted that such restrictions must be content-neutral, serve significant
government interests, and be narrowly tailored.9" The Court was

particularly sensitive in these cases to discretionary licensing schemes
which gave rise to potential content discrimination. 99 The Court
recognized that permit schemes might be necessary to the orderly exercise of expression,' 0 but struck down licensing schemes which
lacked standards and, thus, vested too much discretion in an issuing

95. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981), where the Court stated
that a free exercise infringement can occur where the state denies an important benefit
"because of conduct mandated by religious belief," indicating that affirmative conduct as well
as acts of conscience are protected under the free exercise clause.
96. For general discussions of the evolution of the public forum doctrine, see Kalven,
The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1;Stone, Fora
Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233.
97. See, e.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (preaching religious message by
loudspeaker); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (distribution of leaflets advertising a religious meeting); Lovel v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (distribution of
religious literature).
Commentators have noted that during this period the rights of religious adherents were
almost exclusively protected by the free speech clause, with no independent protection afforded through the free exercise clause. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 94, at 561-65; Pfeffer,
The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115, 1130 (1973). Although the Court occasionally based its decision on free exercise grounds, in doing so it applied analysis essentially
derived from free speech cases. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (invalidating licensing scheme on free exercise grounds but applying analysis previously
developed in free speech cases).
98. See, e.g., Saia, 334 U.S. at 563; Martin, 319 U.S. at 143; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304.
99. See, e.g., Saia, 334 U.S. at 561; Lovell, 303 U.S. at 450.
100. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395,408 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569, 574 (1941).

19871

RELIGIOUS ZONING

officer.10 1 Thus, the Court wanted to provide for evenhanded regulation of speech that avoided unnecessary burdens.
The Supreme Court in recent years has continued to apply this intermediate standard of review to time, place, and manner restrictions
on speech,"'2 again including such restrictions on expressive religious
activities. In Heffron v. InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness Inc.,I 3 the Court held that a locational restriction on the distribution of literature at the Minnesota state fair was a time, place, and
manner restriction on the free speech rights of the International
Society for Krishna Consciousness. 04 Although the Court found the
restriction valid, it applied intermediate scrutiny by requiring that
the regulation be content-neutral, serve a significant state interest in
the least restrictive means possible, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.' 0 5 Moreover, the Court in Widmar v.
Vincent' 1 6 struck down, on content-neutrality grounds, a regulation
which prohibited religious groups from meeting on a university campus but allowed other groups to meet, and expressly held that corporate worship and prayer are expressive activities protected by the
free speech clause.' 7
These Supreme Court decisions suggest two rationales for applying this analysis to the regulation of religious exercise that falls short
of the coercive burden necessary to trigger strict judicial scrutiny.

101. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308
U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
102. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984);
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
103. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
104. Id. at 647-48. Although the Krishna's trial court complaint, based on 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleged a violation of both the free exercise and free speech clauses, in its brief and
in oral argument the Krishna said it did not seek special treatment because of its religion and
noted that "whatever exemption they were entitled to under the First Amendment would apply
to other organizations seeking similar rights," indicating their argument was based upon their
right to free speech. Id. at 652 n.15.
105. Id. at 647-55. The Court found the restriction to be content-neutral because it applied
evenhandedly to everyone wanting to distribute materials or solicit funds. Id. at 649. It served
a significant governmental interest in controlling crowds at the state fair and thus protected
the "safety and convenience" of persons using a public forum. Id. at 650. The regulation was
deemed the least restrictive means of achieving that governmental interest, since any exemption from the regulation could not be limited to just the Krishnas but would have to extend to
all groups desiring to engage in the regulated activities. This would defeat the government interest being sought. Id. at 652-53. Finally, the regulation left open ample alternative channels
of expression, since it allowed the Krishnas to distribute literature and solicit funds from a
booth within the fairgrounds, and they were free to pursue those same activities unrestricted
outside the fairgrounds. Id. at 654-55.
106. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
107. In Widmar, the Court held that a public university could not prohibit a religious
group from using campus facilities when use of such facilities was extended to non-religious
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First, the Court has consistently applied a broad definition of
"speech" under the first amendment, which includes most affirmative religious conduct. This definition has included not only activities
such as preaching and proselytizing,' but also such core religious
conduct as the corporate worship and prayer that were recently protected in Widmar." 9 The central role that worship plays in the life of

a church suggests that restrictions on church location can be considered a restriction on speech."

0

Second, the rationales that support an intermediate level of review
for time, place, and manner restrictions on speech suggest that
parallel protection should also be afforded to expressive religious exercise independently under the free exercise clause. The essence of
the intermediate standard is that the protections afforded by the free
speech clause go beyond the protection against the direct suppression

of speech and include some protection against indirect regulatory
burdens. This protection from indirect burdens is required both
because fundamental free speech rights require some accommoda-

tion relative to nonspeech interests,I' and because such protection
ensures that the state does not indirectly or inadvertantly suppress
speech while furthering legitimate nonspeech interests." 2 Thus,
although the Court will tolerate incidental burdens on speech from
groups. The Court stated that although the university could regulate the use of facilities, it
must be done on a content-neutral basis, which the university failed to do because it
discriminated against religious speech. In so holding, the Court expressly stated that religious
worship is a form of expressive conduct protected under the free speech clause of the first
amendment, stating that "[hlere the UMKC has discriminated against student groups and
speakers based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship and
discussion. These are forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment." Id.
at 269. In a lengthy footnote, the Court specifically rejected the dissent's argument that
religious worship is not speech protected by the "free speech" guarantee of the first amendment and the "equal protection" guarantee of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 269 n.6.
108. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
109. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269.
110. See Comment, supra note 14, at 1149-52 (discussing expressive nature of religious
worship); see also Reynolds, supra note 43, at 781 n.82.
111. This need to make some accommodation for speech relative to state interests was
established early in Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), in which the Court
struck down a licensing ban on leafletting. Stressing that "freedom of speech and that of the
press" were "fundamental personal rights and liberties," the Court stated that "[miere
legislative preferences . . . respecting matters of public convenience," though able to support
restrictions on other personal activities, were insufficient to justify the burdens imposed on
such important freedoms. Id. at 161. This demonstrates that the "substantiality of interest"
part of the intermediate standard requires some increased accommodation of speech interests
because of their fundamental nature. This is particularly relevant to regulation of conduct
under the free exercise clause, since the Court has made similar statements regarding the importance of free exercise rights. See infra note 115.
112. This concern is clearly at work in the ample alternatives requirement. See City Coun-
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reasonable regulations, the fundamental nature of the right affected
requires inquiry into the restriction's scope, purpose, and effect to
ensure a proper accommodation of interests." 3
These same concerns apply with equal force to time, place, and
manner restrictions on conduct falling within the free exercise
clause.' ' The Supreme Court has frequently emphasized the funda5
mental value and importance of free exercise interests," suggesting
the need to accommodate that interest at least to the same extent as
speech interests. Moreover, the effect upon, and potential threat to,
religious exercise by time, place, and manner regulations is similar to
that found in speech contexts. Although such restrictions do not
constitute Sherbert-style infringements, they do incidentally burden a
fundamental right and potentially threaten its effective exercise.
Similar inquiries into the restriction's scope, purpose, and effort
of interests and
are appropriate to ensure a proper accommodation
6
right."1
the
of
exercise
the effective

cil v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-21 (1978).
113. Commentators have frequently spoken of time, place, and manner analysis as
a "balancing" of state interests and first amendment rights, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra
note 112, § 12-20, or ensuring a "fair accommodation" of speech and nonspeech interests. See
Stone, supra note 96, at 241. Although not clearly articulated as such by the Court, ensuring a
proper accommodation of interests seems implicit in the various aspects of the intermediate
standard of review by focusing on the precision of regulation, substantiality of interest, and
availability of alternatives.
114. To qualify for free exercise protection conduct must be "rooted in religion." See
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713-14 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16
(1972). Although the primary free exercise decisions have involved acts of conscience, free exercise protections clearly go to affirmative conduct as well. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718;
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
115. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), where the Court in discussing the standard of review for free exercise infringements stated that "in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limiations."' Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 (1945)).
Similarly, in Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-15, the Court characterized free exercise as a "fundamental right," noting that the values underlying the religion clauses have been "zealously
protected, sometimes at the expense of other interests of admittedly high social importance."
The Court concluded that "only those interests of the highest order ... can overbalance legitimate
claims to the free exercise of religion." Accord Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
116. The particular problems addressed by the intermediate standard would also exist and
be relevant to restrictions on free exercise conduct. The fundamental nature of the right affected argues in favor of precision in regulation as reflected in the narrowly tailored requirement. Similarly, the fundamental nature of religious exercise should require a significant or
substantial interest to justify even incidental burdens on religious exercise as occur under locational restrictions. Even more important is the concern reflected in the "ample alternatives"
requirement that the state not inadvertently eliminate the effective exercise of a fundamental
right when furthering otherwise important interests. That inquiry seems necessary to protect
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The early public forum case of Cantwell v. Connecticut"' provides support for going beyond free speech analysis and recognizing
a parallel time, place, and manner jurisprudence under the free exercise clause. In Cantwell, the Court examined a discretionary licensing scheme which required that, before a person could solicit contributions for a religious cause, a licensing officer had to certify the
cause was in fact religious."' Although the Court had previously
used the free speech clause to strike down licensing schemes which

affected religious exercise," 9 in Cantwell it specifically based its decision on the free exercise

clause.' 2 0 The Court noted

that

municipalities could make religious exercise subject to time, place,
and manner restrictions,' 2' but found that the discretionary nature
of the statute constituted a prior restraint and violated the free exer-

cise clause.' 22 In so holding, however, the Court relied on prior
restraint principles developed in free speech cases,'23 suggesting

that a separate but parallel analysis for time, place, and manner
restrictions on religious conduct exists under the free exercise clause.
In sum, the intermediate standard of review developed for time,
place, and manner restrictions on speech is appropriate to apply to

restrictions on religious activities, both because of the expressive
nature of such activities and because a parallel analysis can also be
supported under the free exercise clause. Although the Supreme
Court has articulated the standard in different ways, it has generally
required that a regulation serve a significant state interest in a narrowly tailored fashion, leave ample alternatives for exercise of the
first amendment right, and be content-neutral.' 2 ' The Court has also
any liberty, and is consistent with the Supreme Court's recognition that even indirect burdens
can violated free exercise rights. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. Finally, the content-neutrality
focus is clearly applicable to regulations of religious activity in any event. Content-neutrality
has consistently been at the core of religious freedom analysis. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
117. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
118. The statute in Cantwell provided that before a person could solicit contributions for a
religious cause, he had to apply for and receive a certificate, the grant of which was based
upon a determination by "the secretary of the public welfare council . . .[that the] cause is a
religious one .. . and conforms to reasonable standards of efficiency and integrity." Id. at
301-02.
119. See Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
120. 310 U.S. at 303-04. Indeed, it was in Cantwell that the Court first incorporated the
free exercise clause into the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 303.
121. Id. at 304.
122. Id.at 306-07.
123. Id. at 305-07 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
124. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984);
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
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demonstrated in recent years that this standard applies when the
state regulates expressive activity through zoning, which it has
viewed as a form of time, place, and manner restriction.12 Because,
as shown above, time, place, and manner jurisprudence developed
with regard to speech is also applicable to comparable restrictions on
religious conduct, these zoning cases regarding speech reflect constitutional principles that are applicable to zoning cases under either
the first amendment's free speech or free exercise clause.
The right of municipalities to regulate expressive conduct through
zoning was first recognized in Young v. American Mini Theatres,
' in which the
Inc., 26
Court upheld a Detroit ordinance that prohibited the location of adult theaters within 1000 feet of another
adult theater or other specified regulated uses. Both Justice Stevens'
plurality opinion and Justice Powell's concurrence articulated the
need to apply a heightened standard of review for any zoning restriction on speech. 27' They readily accepted the validity of imposing
locational restrictions on theaters in general, however, because of the
important interests served by land use controls and because the
restrictions did not restrain the theater market.' 28 Further, both opinions found that the more restrictive treatment of adult theaters was

Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-49 (1981).
125. Although most decisions involved restrictions on adult uses, the Court also reviewed
a zoning restriction on first amendment rights in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490 (1981), in which it struck down a San Diego billboard ordinance. The ordinance prohibited most noncommercial billboards and all offsite commercial billboards, but allowed onsite commercial billboards and some noncommercial billboards based on message. Justice
White's plurality opinion, though upholding the distinction between onsite and offsite commercial billboards, found the provisions regulating noncommercial billboards invalid because
they violated content-neutrality.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion, necessary for a majority, treated the ordinance, in
effect, as a total ban on noncommercial billboards and stated that the city had not proved a sufficiently substantial interest in aesthetics to justify such a ban, relying on an underinclusive
analysis. Id. at 530-34 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). A majority of the Court in
Metromedia, however, stated that a municipality's interest in aesthetics is sufficient to justify
a prohibition of billboards. See id. at 507-08 (plurality opinion); id. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 559-60 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
126. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
127. Id. at 63 n.18 (plurality opinion) (viewing zoning restriction on first amendment use
as time, place, and manner restriction which to be valid must be "necessary to further significant government interests"); id. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring) (requiring, inter alia, that
regulation "further an important or substantial interest" and that it be "essential to the furtherance of that interest") (citing United States v.. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
128. Id. at 62-63 (plurality opinion); id. at 82 (Powell, J., concurring).
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justified because of the distinct secondary effects accompanying
those theaters.' 29 An emphasis on the fact that the restriction did not
greatly suppress speech' 30 was central to both opinions.
The Young approach was recently affirmed in City of Renton v.
Playtime Theaters, Inc.'"' in which the Court upheld a zoning
restriction similar to that in Young. The Court again viewed the ordinance as a time, place, and manner restriction3 2 on first amendment activity and justified the more restrictive treatment of adult
theaters on the distinct secondary affects accompanying adult
theaters.' 33 Unlike the ordinance in Young, however, the restriction
in Playtime appeared to significantly limit speech rights by allowing
adult uses in only about five percent of the city, with much of that
property currently occupied by businesses."' Despite this apparent
burden, the Court held that the ordinance did not suppress speech
and was constitutional. Emphasizing that the city was not obligated
to provide land at bargain prices, the Court stated that the first amendment only required that there be a "reasonable opportunity" to exercise the right in question.' 35
In contrast to Young and Playtime, the Court in Schad v.
Borough of Mt. Ephraim3 6 struck down a zoning restriction that effectively excluded all live entertainment from the Borough of Mt.

Ephraim, a small suburban community."' The Court stressed the
129. Although Justice Stevens readily accepted the validity of locational restrictions on
theaters in general, he viewed as more problematic the potential equal protection violation
posed by regulating adult theaters more restrictively than other theaters. He justified the
greater restrictions, however, both by suggesting that pornography was deserving of only
limited first amendment protection, id. at 70, and by emphasizing the distinct secondary effects generated by adult bookstores, such as deterioration of surrounding neighborhoods and
increased crime. Id. at 71-72, 71 n.34. Justice Powell's concurring opinion saw no need to afford less protection to pornographic speech, but instead justified the disparate treatment
because of the differing secondary effects. Id. at 82 n.6.
130. Id. at 71 n.35; id. at 77-79. Justice Stevens said "[t]he situation would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful
speech." Id. at 71 n.35.
131. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
132. Id. at 928.
133. Id. at 929. The Court stated that although at first glance the ordinance might appear
to violate content-neutrality by regulating adult theaters differently than others, it found the
ordinance consistent with the content-neutrality requirement because the greater restrictions
were based on the distinct secondary effects accompanying adult theaters. Id.
134. See id. at 932.
135. Id.
136. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
137. See id. at 62-65. Although the ordinance in Schad was applied against an adult
bookstore which included live nude dancers, the Court treated the issue as involving a complete ban on all commercial live entertainment, including plays, concerts, musicals, dance, and
other forms of live entertainment fully protected by the first amendment. Id. at 65-66.
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significant limitation upon free speech and found the ordinance unconstitutional in two respects. First, the Borough failed to establish
that live entertainment in general created problems greater than
those generated by commercial uses that were allowed, thus undermining the substantiality of its interest in singling out live entertainment for regulation.' 38 The Court also noted that to the extent that
certain types of live entertainment might pose distinct problems, the
city failed to show that means less restrictive than a total ban on
adult entertainment were unavailable to address those problems. 39
Second, the ordinance was also unconstitutional because it failed
to establish that adequate alternatives were available for exercise of
the first amendment right in light of the total ban within the
Borough. Although the Court emphasized the suppressive effect of
the ordinance in evaluating the Borough's asserted interests,'" it appeared to hold that the total ban was an independent ground for invalidating the ordinance.' The Court did not preclude the validity
138. See id. at 73-75 (live entertainment did not present trash, parking, and traffic problems more significant than that accompanying permitted commercial uses). The Court also
stated that under a time, place, and manner analysis the Borough failed to show that live entertainment was incompatible with permitted uses in the commercial district from which it was
banned. Id. at 75-77.
139. Id. at 74. The Court stated:
Yet this ordinance is not narrowly drawn to respond to what might be the distinctive
problems arising from certain types of live entertainment, and it is not clear that a
more selective approach would fail to address those unique problems if any there
are. The Borough has not established that its interests could not be met by restrictions that are less intrusive on protected forms of expression.
Id.
140. See id. at 71.
141. The Court was unclear in establishing how the ordinance's suppressive effect affected
its standard of review. In the first part of the opinion, the Court emphasized the suppressive
impact of the ordinance in establishing its standard of review, stating that "[blecause the ordinance challenged in this case significantly limits communicative activity within the Borough,
we must scrutinize both the interests advanced by the Borough to justify this limitation on protected expression and the means chosen to further those interests." Id. at 71. This suggests
that the heightened scrutiny was contingent on a significantly suppressive impact. Yet, the
Court acknowledged in a footnote that even small and incidental restrictions on first amendment conduct require heightened scrutiny. Id. at 69 n.7 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968)). This is consistent with time, place, and manner jurisprudence which subjects
any regulation of first amendment activity to an intermediate standard of review.
Later in the decision that Court analyzed the validity of the restriction as a time, place, and
manner regulation, finding it invalid for two separate reasons. First, the Borough failed to
show that live entertainment was incompatible with other uses in the district, using reasoning
similar to its earlier underinclusiveness analysis. Second, the Court indicated that the ordinance also was invalid because it failed to establish available alternatives. Id. at 75-77. Whereas
in the first part of the decision the suppressive effect merely heightened review, in the second
part of the decision the Court suggested that it was an independent basis for rejecting the ordinance. These positions are best reconciled by finding that a zoning restriction fails as a time,
place, and manner restriction if it fails to leave ample alternatives for exercise of the regulated
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of a total ban, but stated that at least in the absence of a showing
that alternatives were available elsewhere the ban must fail.' 4 2
These zoning decisions demonstrate the applicability of time,
place, and manner jurisprudence to first amendment zoning restrictions. As in other contexts, the Court will more readily tolerate zoning regulations which only minimally restrain first amendment exercise than those which significantly suppress it. Yet, even restrictions
that do not significantly suppress speech must meet a heightened
standard of review.' 43 In particular, the Court has focused on the existence of identifiable secondary effects as justifying the zoning of
first amendment activity. 44 Further, the decisions affirm that zoning
restrictions on first amendment activity must be a "narrowly
tailored" means of serving the state's interest, suggesting primarily
that restrictions that unnecessarily include categories or types of first
amendment activities that do not generate the targeted effects might
be overbroad. 14 The next section of the article will discuss the application of these zoning and time, place, and manner precedents to
zoning restrictions on churches.

III.

LOCATIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON CHURCHES

First amendment precedent, involving both time, place, and manner restrictions on religious conduct and zoning restrictions on first
amendment activity, establishes that a locational restriction on
religious worship, though not a Sherbert-type free exercise clause
right, in which case the restriction is subjected to a standard of review approaching strict
scrutiny.
142. Id. at 75-76.
143. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 928 (1986); Schad v.
Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 n.7 (1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18 (1976) (plurality opinion); id. at 80-81 (Powell, J., concurring).
144. This is consistent with the Court's frequent focus on "compatibility" in assessing the
strength of asserted state interests supporting time, place, and manner restrictions. See, e.g.,
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) (footnote omitted) ("The nature of a
place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and
manner that are reasonable ....
The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activitiy of a particular place at a particular time.")
Accord Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650-51
(1981). Indeed, the Court in Schad expressly applied this compatibility analysis to the zoning
restriction. 452 U.S. at 74-75.
145. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 74 (to the extent that some live entertainment might raise
distinctive problems justifying the challenged restrictions, the Borough has failed to show that
a "more selective approach" would not address those problems); Young, 427 U.S. at 82
(Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting that the ordinance would be unconstitutional if it included
within its reach "types of theaters that had not been shown to contribute to the deterioration
of surrounding areas"); Playtime Theaters, 106 S. Ct. at 931 (stating that the ordinance was
"'narrowly tailored' to affect only that category of theaters shown to produce the unwanted
secondary effects").
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violation, must nevertheless meet four requirements to be constitutional. It must serve a substantial state interest, be narrowly drawn,
leave open adequate means of exercise, and be content-neutral.I4 6
This section will discuss these requirements as they apply to zoning
restrictions on churches, first examining the requirements of
substantiality of interest and precision of regulation. It will then
discuss the requirement of available alternatives. It will end by examining concerns of content-neutrality in the context of special-use permits in which discrimination problems are most likely to occur.
A.

Significance of Interest and Precisionof Means

There is little doubt that, in the abstract, municipalities have a sufficiently substantial interest in preserving quiet neighborhoods to
justify locational restrictions on churches within residential districts.
Although not speaking in a first amendment context, in Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas141 the Court emphasized that the state has a
substantial interest in preserving the tranquility of residential
neighborhoods. The Court has recently emphasized in several first
amendment contexts that both traffic safety and aesthetics are
substantial enough concerns to justify the restriction of protected activities. 1 48 Indeed, the Court has consistently emphasized the importance of the goals achieved by land use planning. 49 To the extent that
churches are a significantly more intense use of land than those normally found in residential neighborhoods, municipalities have a
substantial interest in regulating this use.
The general recognition that the state has a substantial interest in
regulating church location, however, does not establish that the interest is substantial in all instances. Schad demonstrates that
substantiality of interst must be assessed, not in the abstract, but
relative to surrounding permitted uses.' 5 ° Where the secondary effects from churches are not more intense in terms of traffic, noise,
and parking than permitted uses, the regulation is arguably
underinclusive and, therefore, invalid. Thus, although municipalities
146. See supra note 124.
147. 416 U.S. 1 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
148. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806-07 (1984) (city had
significant interest in aesthetics to justify first amendment restriction); Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981) (traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial interests justifying viewpoint neutral restrictions on first amendment).
149. See, e.g., Young, 427 U.S. at 71 ("the city's interest in attempting to preserve the
quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect").
150. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 73-75 (1981). This emphasis on
assessing the substantiality of the state's interest relative to surrounding uses is also seen in a
number of time, place, and manner decisions in which the Court has focused on a "compatibility" standard in assessing state interests. See supra note 144.
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have a substantial interest in excluding churches from low density
residential zones, attempts to exclude them from commercial or
business zones are invalid.' 5 Additionally, excluding churches from
residential districts, while permitting other intensive land uses, such as
schools, libraries, and museums, is arguably underinclusive and invalid as well.'"

More problematic to an analysis of church zonings is whether the
state's interest can be furthered by a more narrow means than a
blanket exclusion of churches from residential neighborhoods. To
avoid unnecessary intrusions on the first amendment, time, place,
and manner analysis has consistently required some precision in
achieving the state's interest." 3 This requirement was affirmed in
Young, Schad, and Playtime Theaters as a constitutionally necessary

element for valid zoning restrictions on first amendment activity." ' ,
Thus, to the extent that the state's interest in zoning churches can be
furthered by a means less restrictive than a blanket exclusion they
must fall.

A zoning ordinance that restricts any first amendment activity,
such as religious worship, might be overbroad and invalid in

two ways. First, as suggested in Schad, an ordinance that unnecessarily includes within its reach first amendment uses that do not
generate the effects giving rise to the state's interest in regulation is
overbroad and invalid."' Second, an ordinance can also be overbroad if adequate alternative remedies exist that control the actual
secondary effects themselves without prohibiting the first amendment source. 5 6 In the church zoning context such a remedy would be
151. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses Assembly Halls of New Jersey, Inc. v. City of Jersey
City, 597 F. Supp. 972, 982 (D.N.J. 1984).
152. See Ellsworth v. Gercke, 62 Ariz. 198, 202, 156 P.2d 242, 244 (1945) (invalidating
ordinance which excluded churches from residential district but permitted schools, museums,
and libraries). But see Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App. 2d 12, 24, 330 P.2d 255,
270-71 (1958), appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959) (upholding ordinance which excluded
churches but permitted schools, museums, and libraries).
153. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984);
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984); Grace v. United States, 461
U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981).
154. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 928 (1986); Schad v.
Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68-71 (1981); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,
427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18 (1976) (plurality opinion) (zoning restriction must be .'necesary' to further significant governmental interests"); id. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring) (restriction on
first amendment must be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance" of the state's interest).
155. See 452 U.S. at 74-75; see also Young, 427 U.S. at 82 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The
case would present a different situation had Detroit brought within the ordinance types of
theaters that had not been shown to contribute to the deterioration of surrounding areas.").
156. See, e.g., Schneider v. Town of lrvington, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939) (state's in-
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an effective control on the traffic, noise, and parking problems that
did not directly prohibit the religious worship, which gives rise to
these concerns.
As discussed earlier, zoning ordinances typically restrict church
location in two ways: through a special-use permit process regulating
location within residential districts or by completely excluding churches from residential districts. The special-use process appears to be
a narrowly drawn means of serving the state's interest since it involves a case-by-case decision whether the state's interest justifies
regulating a particular church. By requiring an individual assessment
of a church's potential incompatibility with its surroundings, this approach is designed to avoid restrictions on churches that do not pose
a threat to residential neighborhoods and, thus, avoids the first type
of overbreadth mentioned above. Further, the process also allows
alternative land controls, such as off-street parking requirements, traffic controls, and noise regulations, as a means of controlling the
effects of the church and, thus, addresses the second type of overbreadth. Although restricting location by special-use permits poses
potential content-neutrality problems, the particularized nature of
the restriction makes it a narrowly tailored means of regulation for

first amendment purposes.
More problematic under a least restrictive means analysis is the
validity of a blanket exclusion of churches from residential areas.
Such an approach to furthering the state's interest of preserving
residential neighborhoods arguably is overbroad for both reasons
above: it fails to assess whether a particular church in fact poses a

threat to a residential neighborhood, and it falls to pursue less
restrictive alternative controls, such as parking requirements, traffic
controls, and noise regulations.' " The overbreadth of blanket exclusions might seem particularly acute because of the existence of the
widely used special-use alternative described above. The willingness
of many municipalities to use special-use permits suggests that the
state's interest in preserving residential areas can be served by this
less restrictive alternative.

Whether blanket exclusions are unnecessarily broad and, thus, invalid depends on the exact definition of the least restrictive means requirement in the context of time, place, and manner restrictions. In

strict scrutiny review, the least restrictive means requirement usually
necessitates an assessment of whether the marginally greater effecterest in controlling littering could be met by fining those who litter rather than prohibiting
leafletting).
157. For arguments which in essence state that blanket exclusions of churches from
residential neighborhoods are not a narrowly drawn means of regulation, see Comment, supra
note 14.
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tiveness of the challenged regulation, as compared to the alternatives, justifies the greater burden on the first amendment.'" Such
a balancing of marginal harms and benefits permits some sacrifice in
the protection of the state's interest if a corresponding furtherance
of first amendment values is accomplished.' 59 Similarly, state regulation of traditional fora or media of expression, such as parks and

streets, requires a restriction more narrow than a complete ban.' 60
This constitutional requirement resembles the balancing of marginal
harms and benefits in that it requires some accommodation of expressive rights despite the resulting inconvenience to the state.' 6'
Where the challenged restriction does not greatly suppress speech
or access to traditional fora, however, the Court has not appeared to

158.

See M. NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.06[A][4] n.20 (1985). Although the Court

has not clearly articulated such a marginal balancing of interests, commentators frequently interpret the Court's analysis as suggesting such an approach. See, e.g., id.; L. TRIBE, supra note
112; Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975).

159. For example, once a free exercise infringement is established in free exercise analysis
the state must show that it has a compelling interest in not granting an exemption to the
religious claimant. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-18 (1972). This, in effect,
amounts to a balancing of the marginal utility of the state's interest in regulating the religious
exercise against the burden to religion.
160. The Court strongly suggested in some of its early decisions that although the state can
regulate use of traditional fora, such as streets and parks it could not altogether ban first
amendment exercise from such places. See, e.g., Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307
U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939); Schneider v. Town of lrvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). This was
recently affirmed in Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983), in which the Court in dictum again stated that the state may not prohibit all first
amendment activity from traditional fora. See generally Kalven, supra note 96. The Court has
clearly recognized, however, that the state can regulate the use of such fora through less intrusive means such as parade permits. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1941).
161. Requiring accommodation of some first amendment activity in such fora will likely
result in some inconvenience or cost to the state. For example, allowing use of the streets for
parades or other demonstrations, to some extent, will interfere with the state's interest in orderly
traffic. Allowing the distribution of leaflets similarly will result in some inconvenience. See
Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). The special status of these fora and
media, however, require that some accommodation be made by more narrowly drawn regulations.
The need for such accommodation apparently derives from both the traditional and important role that such places play in first amendment exercise. Early in its public forum
jurisprudence the Court noted that the streets and parks had long been held in trust for expressive activities, suggesting a type of ftrst amendment easement. See, e.g., Committee for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. at 515-16. The Court and commentators have also emphasized the important
role that such fora and media play in the exercise of first amendment rights, especially for
the poor, as a reason for requiring some accommodation of expressive activities. See Saia
v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948); Martin v. STruthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943);
L. TRIBE, supra note 112, § 12-20. This suggests that where a particular fora plays a unique
and significant role in first amendment exercise some accommodation of exercise is required.
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balance the marginal utilities of alternative regulations, but instead
has looked to whether the state's interest could be pursued as effectively by other means. 6 In particular, the Court has been willing to
find restrictions "narrowly drawn" if the alternatives would not as
effectively serve the state interest 63 or if the restricted activity cannot be separated from its objectionable effects.' 6 Further, the Court
has been willing to tolerate a complete ban on expression in particular fora'6 5 or by particular media 66 if the restriction is not
gratuitous and adequate alternatives exist. In such situations, the
"narrowly tailored" requirement appears to require only that the
restriction is not truly broader than necessary to effectuate the
state's purpose and that it does not necessarily include within its
reach conduct not giving rise to the state's interest.
This analysis suggests that, despite the existence of a special-use
alternative, a blanket exclusion of churches from residential
neighborhoods would not be an overly broad manner of regulation,
at least where ample alternatives exist for churches to locate.
Although churches vary in their potentially intrusive effect on residential neighborhoods, even smaller, less active churches are a more intrusive land use than normally exists in a residential district and,
thus, are potentially incompatible. The regulation of churches by the
special-use permit process assumes that there is some threshold level
of adverse effects below which a church is a compatible, and even
desirable, land use in residential districts. Yet, a municipality might
find that even minor effects from a church are objectionable,
especially where there is a potential for the secondary land use effects to increase as the church grows.
Moreover, regulations aimed at the adverse effects themselves
arguably are only partially effective. Although parking problems can be
adequately and less intrusively eliminated by off-street parking requirements implemented in a special-use permit process, noise and
traffic problems can only be partially alleviated by secondary regulations. Both are inevitable consequences of a more intensive use of
162. See M. NIMMER, supra note 158, § 2.06[4].
163. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984)
(upholding ban on sleeping in park, through recognized as an expressive activity, because less
restrictive alternatives such as reducing "size, duration, or frequency of demonstrations"
would cause some damage to the park and not meet the level of protection deemed necessary
by the park service).
164. See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-10 (1984)
(upholding prohibition on posting signs on utility poles, since the state's interest in curtailing
visual clutter cannot be separated from the expressive activity, but is an inevitable byproduct).
165. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981).
166. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
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land, which results when a church is located in a residential
district.167 Thus, the imposition of additional traffic controls and the
enforcement of noise restrictions would only partially further the
state's interest of preserving residential neighborhoods.
Such an analysis is consistent with the Court's apparent focus on
categorical imprecision under the "narrowly tailored" means requirement in its first amendment zoning decisions. None of these
decisions suggest the need for an individualized assessment of a
regulated use's actual impact. Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., though stating that the
restriction must be "necessary," summarily accepted the categorical
restriction on adult uses. 6" Both Justice Powell's concurrence in
Young' 69 and the majority opinion in Schad 17 only alluded to imprecision in the types of use regulated when discussinkg the "narrowly
tailored" requirement. This analysis of the "narrowly tailored" requirement was again used in Playtime Theaters, in which the Court
found the regulation "narrowly tailored" because it did not include
"categories" not generating the secondary effects to be avoided.' 7'
The Court, therefore, appears willing to tolerate the individualized
imprecision which inevitably occurs in zoning, assuming the restriction does not significantly suppress first amendment rights.
In principle, therefore, both the categorical exclusion of churches
from residential neighborhoods and the more narrowly drawn
special-use permit process are permissible means of regulating
churches. As has been generally true in time, place, and manner
jurisprudence, the most important constitutional safeguards are the
assurance of adequate alternative areas for exercise of the right to
worship and the assurance of content-neutrality in ordinances
regulating the location of churches. The next two sections will
discuss these requirements, with the second section focusing on the
special-use process.
B.

The Need for Ample Alternatives

The Supreme Court has frequently noted that an otherwise valid
time, place, and manner restriction on "speech" may be invalid if

167. See id. at 808-10 (suggesting that to the extent the objectionable byproducts can be
separately regulated, a less restrictive means exists, but where the byproducts are inherent in
the first amendment activity itself, limiting the activity is not overly broad).
168.
169.
170.
171.

427 U.S. 50, 63 n.18 (1976).
Id. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring).
Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 74 (1981).
City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 931 (1986).
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the remaining avenues of communication are inadequate. 7 , This has
usually been an issue where the state restricts access to a particular
forum for communication or prohibits a particular medium of expression. When analyzing the adequacy of the remaining alternatives, the Court has focused on both the traditional first amendment role played by the particular forum or medium and the necessity for effective communication.' 7 3 In this regard, the Court has
shown special solicitude for forms of expression that have been viewed as traditionally necessary for adequate expression in our society,
such as access to parks and streets and the use of leafletting. 7 At
the same time, however, the first amendment clearly does not
guarantee the right to the best or least expensive means of exercise
available. As long as the particular forum is not deemed essential for
reaching a particular audience, the Court has been willing to tolerate
less effective alternatives.' 75
When the state regulates first amendment activity on private property through zoning ordinances, however, the analysis is distinctively
different. In such situations there is usually no readily available
substitute in the form of other media or public fora.' 76 The requirement that there be adequate alternatives, therefore, requires that
there be an ample supply of available land on which the activity is
allowed, or the restriction arguably becomes vulnerable to constitutional attack. This requirement was highlighted in Young where the
plurality and concurring opinions both stressed that their willingness
to uphold the challenged regulation of adult theaters was in large
part because the ordinance did not completely suppress the regulated
speech.' 77 This requirement was stressed again in Schad where a major consideration in striking down the ordinance was that it effectively banned a form of first amendment expression.'
Despite its importance, however, evaluating the adequacy of alternative sites is admittedly difficult because of the dual public and
172. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); City
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.
171, 177 (1983); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 654-55 (1981).
173. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 112.
174. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("Door-to-door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people."); L. TRIBE, supra note 112, §
12-20.
175. See Taxpayersfor Vincent, 466 U.S. at 812.
176. The regulation of billboards on private property is an exception, since the communicative purpose served by billboards can often be served by other media. See Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
177. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62 (1976) (plurality opinion);
id. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
178. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 71-72 (1981).
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market roles involved in determining the availability of land
resources for a particular use. A zoning regulation that permits a
particular land use is a minimum requirement without which the land
use cannot occur. Beyond that, however, land might not be
"available" if it is already developed or, if available, it might not be
suitable for religious use. Despite obvious difficulties, therefore, an
accurate assessment of the adequacy of alternatives should not only
examine public controls but also private market realties. In fact,
lower courts subsequent to Young have scrutinized particularly
restrictive adult use ordinances to ensure that there are adequate
alternative sites, focusing not only on the amount of land actually
zoned, but on its suitability and market availability." 9
The Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theaters, Inc."' suggests that these concerns are best balanced by
a "reasonable opportunity" standard of review. In that decision, the
Court upheld an adult use ordinance that restricted adult use to about
five percent of the city, relying on a district court finding that there
was still "ample, accessible real estate" in all stages of development.'
Although the Court's decision clearly available for a particular first
amendment exercise, the Court stated that municipalities must provide a "reasonable opportunity" for first amendment uses to meet.I 2
Such an approach suggests that, while first amendment activities must
tolerate some increased cost and inconvenience, which inevitably result
from zoning restrictions,8 3 municipalities cannot force them to accept clearly unsuitable alternatives or to endure unreasonable expense
or hardship.
A proper assessment of "reasonable opportunity" must, of
course, turn on the specific circumstances of the zoning ordinance in
question, and consider both the needs of the regulated activity and
the actual impact of the restriction. When this standard is applied to
religious exercise, however, two concerns are of particular importance. The first is the actual market availability of land within

179. Illustrative of this type of scrutiny is Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203
(5th Cir. 1982), in which the Fifth Circuit struck down a zoning restriction on adult uses which
limited such uses to ten to fifteen percent of the city. The court found that the only land actually available for adult uses were in industrial areas, far from commercial outlets, and with
poor access roads. Id. at 1214. A similar result was reached in Purple Onion. Inc. v. Jackson,
511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981), in which a federal district court scrutinized the actual
suitability of 81 possible sites for adult uses and found the vast majority inadequate, either
because of present development or unsuitability for commercial uses.
180. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
181. Id.at 932.
182. Id.
183. Id.; see also supra note 90.

19871

RELIGIOUS ZONING

districts that allow churches. Although churches need not be
guaranteed land at bargain prices, 84 neither should they be forced to
pay unrealistic sums to buy out and convert existing uses.
"Availability," therefore, should require either sufficient quantities
of undeveloped land to accommodate anticipated church needs 8' 5 or
existing structures clearly suitable for church purposes.
Second, an adequacy analysis should also inquire into the
suitability of the land available for churches. Certainly residential
land cannot be considered essential to church worship and in most
instances provision of nonresidential sites will be adequate. Yet, consideration should be given to whether, looking to both surrounding
property uses and the size of parcels, available property is conducive
to religious worship and assembly. Thus, locating churches in heavy
' or
industrial zones 86
placing them on extremely small parcels that
would limit the scope of activity that could be pursued should
be considered inadequate.' 87 Moreover, in larger cities, districts
where churches are allowed should be reasonably accessible to
residential neighborhoods.
As a practical matter, such inquiries will in most instances establish
the adequacy of alternative sites for churces. As opposed to adult
uses, municipalities will usually tolerate churches in a substantial portion of a city, even when they exclude them from residential
neighborhoods. When an assessment of adequacy establishes that a
"reasonable opportunity" does not exist, courts should more closely
scrutinize the restriction as applied to the particular parcel and require some municipal accommodation of the asserted religious exercise. This should include a particularized assessment of the state's

184. 106 S. Ct. at 932.
185. Cf. Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207, 1224-25 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(court noted that present development made some sites unavailable for zoned adult uses).
186. Cf. Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1214 (5th Cir. 1982) (land zoned
for adult uses in industrial district unsuitable).
187. Similarly, alternatives such as meeting in adherents' homes or renting building space,
suggested by the Sixth Circuit in Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc.
v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983), should be
rejected as unsuitable for the purposes of most churches. As will be discussed in section IV,
churches today typically engage in diverse activities as integral parts of their ministries. See infra text accompanying notes 201-62. Although churches must tolerate some increased cost and
inconvenience as a result of zoning, they should not be required to restrict greatly the ability to
engage in various activities. To require that congregations meet in homes or facilities designed
for significantly different uses would have such an effect. At the same time, however, meeting
in private homes subject to secondary controls should be considered a minimum requirement
for congregations unable to afford facilities elsewhere. See infra text accompanying notes
266-305.
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interest and the use of secondary controls as a less intrusive means
of regulating the church. '
C.

Special-Use Permits and Content-Neutrality

Certainly the most important concern that emerges from Supreme
Court review of time, place, and manner restrictions on first amendment conduct is the requirement of content-neutrality. 8 9 In the zoning context, this concern can arise in several ways, such as ordinances which expressly restrict or exempt conduct based on its content. I" Content-neutrality concerns are most likely to arise with regard
to the special-use permit process because of the inevitable subjectivity involved in reviewing permit requests. When first amendment righs
are affected by such a process, as in the case of churches, special
188. See infra note 141, suggesting that the suppressive effect of the ordinance in Schad
led to heightened scrutiny.
Attempts to exclude churches totally from a municipality should also be declared invalid,
even where alternative sites might exist in surrounding communities. Although five justices in
Schad suggested that they might be willing to uphold complete bans on some first amendment
uses if alternatives existed elsewhere, see Schad, 452 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring, joined
by Stewart, J.); id. at 83 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 85-86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting,
joined by Rehnquist, J.), that analysis would seem inappropriate as applied to churches. The
sentiment expressed by the various justices in Schad was premised on a concern that some first
amendment activities would substantially disrupt or change the character of small, suburban
towns. In particular, they seemed concerned that requiring municipalities to make land
available for all first amendment activities would force a variety of commercial uses on communities that would change their very nature, see id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating
that some communities should be free to ban all commercial public entertainment), or as
Justice Stevens put it, introduce "cacophony into a tranquil setting." Id. at 83 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Thus, at least three of the justices premised their position on what they perceived
to be an increased substantiality of interest that might exist in regulating activities that would
change a community's very nature.
It is highly questionable whether such an analysis would apply with equal force to attempts
to exclude churches from entire communities. Although potentially incompatible with residential neighborhoods, churches would not have the same disruptive impact on suburban communities as would commercial uses. Assuming that the justification for excluding a first
amendment use from a community must be greater than when just locating the use within the
community, the harmful impact of churches should not be viewed as sufficient to justify a
total exclusion. The few state decisions addressing the issue have reached this position. See
Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich. 389, 53 N.W.2d 308 (1952); North Shore
Unitarian Soc'y, Inc. v. Village of Plandome, 200 Misc. 52,f, 109 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1951).
189. Content-neutrality concerns have been the most frequent basis for invalidating time,
place, and manner restrictions. This has involved finding that the regulation was not content
neutral on its face or as applied, see, e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972),
or that the regulation involved a licensing scheme that had the potential for content discrimination.
See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
190. In an analogous context, the Court in Mosley struck down an ordinance which prohibited picketing near schools but exempted labor picketing. The Court found the regulation
violated content-neutrality principles because it gave preference to a particular content. 408
U.S. at 101-02.
191. See supra text accompanyng notes 40, 156-57.
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constitutional concerns arise, most notably the need for nondiscretionary standards and an understanding of the permissible basis for
denying a permit.

As discussed earlier, the special-use permit process p:ovides for an
individualized assessment of a church's compatibility with a particular district and allows for application of special conditions on the
use.' 9' For these reasons, the special-use permit has become a partic-

ularly popular method of regulating church location in residential
districts. Although many jurisdictions prohibit a complete ban on
churches, all jurisdictions acknowledge, at least in theory, the
legitimacy of regulating churches through special-use provisions.92

In practice, however, the standard of judicial scrutiny used when
reviewing permit denials varies considerably. Some states review permit denials to churches with no greater scrutiny than that applied to
other special-uses such as gas stations or hospitals. 9' 3 Most states,

however, consistent with their view on the validity of exclusions, require a clear showing that
the church would be incompatible with
94

neighboring property.'
Although the flexibility offered by the special-use process makes it
an attractive device for regulating churches, it is, in effect, a licensing of first amendment activity and raises questions associated
with content-neutrality. The Supreme Court has frequently examined licensing schemes that were a part of a time, place, and manner

regulation of a protected activity; indeed, much of the Court's early
case law regarding access to public fora involved licensing
schemes. 19 Although the Court has recognized that licensing schemes
may be used to regulate first amendment conduct,' 96 the Court has
consistently held that such schemes must be nondiscretionary and
provide appropriate standards for issuing permits.

197

Further, fac-

192. See supra note 52.
193. See, e.g., West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 121 A.2d 640
(Conn. 1956); Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Or. 281, 330 P.2d 5
(1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 436 (1959).
194. See, e.g., Rogers v. Mayor of Atlanta, 110 Ga. App. 114, 116-20, 137 S.E.2d 668,
671-72 (1964); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., I N.Y.2d 508, 523-25, 136 N.E.2d
827, 834-36, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 859-61 (1956); Congregation Comm. of Congregation of
Jehovah's Witnesses v. City Council, 287 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
195. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Poulos v. New
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v.
Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Largent v. Texas, 318
U.S. 418 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. Town of lrvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
196. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569 (1941).
197. See, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
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ially valid licensing schemes must be applied in a nondiscriminatory
manner, and permits must be issued where the preexisting criteria are

met. 198
These concerns and precedent demonstrate the need for substantial judicial control and supervision when the special-use process is
applied to churches. Although churches generally might not invoke
the same municipal hostility as adult theaters, minority religions are
often viewed as threatening the community well-being and are
potnetially subject to discrimination. Yet, as Professor Reynolds notes,
special-iise provisions for churches are frequently vague and general,
similar to provisions governing non-first amendment uses. 9 9 When
first amendment uses are involved, references to the "general welfare"
fail to provide substantial guidance to issuing authorities and reviewing courts. Even absent proof of actual discrimination, courts should
void regulations that fail to list specific criteria for reviewing specialuse permits to avoid the potential for content discrimination. 0 0
When permit issuance standards are provided, some subjectivity is
inevitable. Although specific factors for consideration, such as traffic, noise, and parking, must be articulated, it is difficult to require
precise levels of objectionable conduct. Attempting to delineate such
precise standards would make ordinances unwieldy and unworkable,
and courts have not required such precision. It would be sufficient
to require that ordinances articulate general factors which would
form an acceptable basis for exclusion of churches from a particular
interest.
Because precision of regulation is impossible in an ordinance
itself, it is also important for courts to undertake meaningful review
of permit denials in two regards. 0' First, courts should closely
scrutinize permit denials to ensure that municipalities substantiate
traffic, noise, parking, and other concerns that form the basis of
their decisions. This obviously means not only that reasons for a
denial must be limited to the criteria stated in the ordinance, but also
that the municipality must be able to substantiate concerns under the

U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
198. See Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
199. See Reynolds, supra note 43, at 786-88.
200. In an analogous zoning situation, courts have struck down special-use requirements
for adult theaters that had only vague and general criteria because of the potential for unbridled discretion over an activity protected by the first amendment. See, e.g., City of Imperial
Beach v. Palm Ave. Books, Inc., 115 Cal. App. 3d 134, 171 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1981); see also
Entertainment Concepts, Inc. Ill v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 505 (7th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981).
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specific facts of the application rather than just by reference to
general state interests." 2 Second, courts should also compare permit
decisions to previous determinations under the ordinance to ensure
that the standards are being applied in an evenhanded way.203
In sum, the first amendment tolerates locational restrictions on
churches subject to several important safeguards. Any locational
restriction, and in particular any complete ban on churches in certain
districts, must not only advance significant state interests, but also
leave ample alternative sites. When location is regulated by specialuse permits, specific standards must be stated in the zoning ordinance,
and permit decisions must be scrutinized to ensure that the state
can substantiate its purported interest and that the ordinance is applied fairly. This article will next examine the scope of the activities
a church can pursue on its property.
IV.

A.

ACCESSORY USES AND THE CHURCH SCHOOL

In General

Distinct from the issue of where churches may locate is the issue of
what activities they may conduct on property zoned for "church"
use. As previously noted, churches today are rapidly expanding their
activities and ministries, particularly in the areas of education and
social services.20 4 Not surprisingly, churches frequently choose to
pursue these activities on their premises rather than seek facilities
elsewhere. As a result, the traditional church building, previously
used only for weekly worship, has become the center of diverse activities throughout the week. Of particular significance is the growing
number of churches that use their facilities for private, religious
schools. This changing use pattern is increasingly being resisted by
residential communities, which, while often willing to tolerate more

201. For a thorough discussion of current deficiencies in the use of special-use permits as
applied to churches and recommended changes, including suggestions for meaningful judicial
review, see Reynolds, supra note 43, at 784-809.
202. As previously noted, most courts do in fact closely scrutinize permit denials and require that zoning boards substantiate their conclusions by specific facts rather than just
abstract state interests. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
203. See Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 112 Ill. App. 3d 223, 445
N.E.2d 343 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983) (holding that denial of special-use permit
violated first amendment where church had met permit requirements and evidence showed that
many other churches had been granted permits in the same district). See generally Reynolds,
supra note 43, at 807-09.
204. Buzzard, America Today, Shaking Foundations, FREEDOM AND FAITH: THE IMPACT
OF LAW ON RELlGious LIBERTY 11, 17-18 (1982); Esbeck, supra note 11, at 367-68.
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traditional forms of church use, seek to limit the scope of activities
churches pursue on their premises.205
Several distinct inquiries are involved in regulating the scope of activities a church may conduct on its property. The key inquiry,
however, requires determination of what activities are encompassed
within a "church" zoning designation; that is, what bundle of uses
make up a "church" for zoning purposes. This, of course, is initially
a matter of statutory interpretation regarding what uses are contemplated by the ordinance. Beyond that, however, constitutional
issues arise regarding the degree to which the first amendment requires accommodation of various activities on church property.
The generally recognized primary use of church property is that of
religious worship and assembly.2" ' Incidents which make up this
primary use are clearly permissible. Zoning law recognizes, however,
that a primary use designation for property also encompasses various
secondary uses, commonly referred to as "accessory uses." 2 7 "Accessory uses" are activities which, while distinct from the primary
or principal use of property, are generally allowed because of their
close relationship with the primary use. Although ordinances vary
in the specificity with which they define permissible accessory uses,
they typically require that an "accessory use" be subordinate as well
as related to the primary use, and most significantly, that it be
"customarily incidental" to the primary use.20 8 As such, these "accessory use" standards serve as a shorthand method both for discerning legislative intent regarding the intended scope of permissible activities and for assessing an activity's potential compatibility with surrounding land.
Courts have taken two general approaches in addressing the
accessory use question with regard to churches. Many courts have
applied the "customarily incidental" standard used in other contexts. Although as a threshold inquiry these courts require that the
use be a religious one and related to the primary church use, the
primary question is whether, from a land use perspective, the activity is one normally associated with churches.2" 9 When applying this
standard, courts have generally shown sensitivity to churches by
broadly characterizing the use in question to bring it within a more
general and acceptable category, and at times have shown sensitivity
205. See, e.g., Churches v. Zoning Boards, The Wash. Post, Nov. 18, 1985, at 34-35 (nat'l
weekly ed.) (reporting of a Fairfax County, Va., conflict between churches and local residents
over the right of churches to use their facilities for religious schools and shelters for the homeless).
206. See 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 41, § 16.11.
207. 2 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, § 23.01.
208. Id. § 23.01[1].
209. See, e.g., East Side Baptist Church of Denver, Inc. v. Klein, 175 Colo. 168, 171, 487
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to the practices of particular sects.2 " Nevertheless, if properly applied, the "customarily incidental" standard allows prohibitions on
secondary uses which, although clearly religious in nature, are not

customarily associated with churches. 2"
A second identifiable approach to the accessory use question is to
allow, as a permissible accessory use, activities that have a religious
purpose or are integral to the church's mission. Although these
courts at times couch their analysis in "customarily incidental"
language, they, in essence, only seek to determine whether the challenged activity is arguably integral to the church's mission, and

decline to limit activities to those "customarily" associated with
churches.2" 2 This approach is occasionally based on language found
in the ordinance involved,213 but more frequently appears to be implicitly based on the first amendment concern that government not
P.2d 549, 550-51 (1971); Board of Zoning Appeals v. Schulte, 241 Ind. 339, 346, 172 N.E.2d
39, 42 (1960); City of Concord v. New Testament Baptist Church, 118 N.H. 56, 58-59, 382
A.2d 377, 379-80 (1978); St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 195
N.J. Super. 414, 418-20, 479 A.2d 935, 937-38 (1983); Mahrt v. First Church of Christ, Scientist,
75 Ohio L. Abs. 5, 16-17, 142 N.E.2d 567, 576-77 (C.P. 1955), aff'd, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 24, 142
N.E.2d 678 (Ct. App. 1956).
210. See, e.g., Schulte, 241 Ind. at 346, 172 N.E.2d at 42; New Testament Baptist Church,
118 N.H. at 58-59, 382 A.2d at 379-80. Any particular use can be characterized at various levels
of specificity or generality, thus allowing courts to manipulate the standard to reach desired
results. If a use is characterized at a high level of generality it is more easily viewed as
customary, since a common element can be found with activities normally associated with
churches. Conversely, if a use is characterized with great specificity, it is less likely to be
viewed as customary since the greater specificity makes the use more unique. For example, a
drug treatment program conducted on church premises can be characterized with substantial
specificity and thus viewed as not customary, since such programs are usually not associated
with churches. On the other hand, it could more generally be characterized as a social service
activity which are somewhat more customary with churches.
211. Although the "customarily incidental" standard has been used to uphold prohibitions on secondary activities, see, e.g., East Side Baptist Church of Denver, Inc., v. Klein, 175
Colo. 168, 487 P.2d 549 (1971) (no evidence that parking buses on church property was
"customarily incidental"), courts have more frequently applied the doctrine to allow the
challenged activity. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Havurah v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 177 Conn. 44; 449-50, 418 A.2d 82,
87-88 (1979) (overnight accommodations permissible accessory use of a Jewish synagogue);
Garbaty v. Norwalk Jewish Center, Inc., 148 Conn. 376, 384, 171 A.2d 197, 200 (1961) (community center including swimming area permissible accessory use); Synod of Chesapeake, Inc.
v. City of Newark, 254 A.2d 611, 613-14 (Del. Ch. 1969) (coffee house permissible accessory
use); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
v. Ashton, 92 Idaho 571, 575, 448 P.2d 185, 189 (1968) (lighted softball field permissible accessory use); Board of Zoning Appeals v. New Testament Bible Church, Inc., 411 N.E.2d 681,
683, 685.(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (church activities building a permissible "contingent use").
213. See Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 66 Misc. 2d 312, 315-18, 319
N.Y.S.2d 937, 943-45 (1971) (ordinance allowing "religious uses" as permissible accessory
uses interpreted to include drug treatment center).

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

unnecessarily interfere with religious exercise.2"" As might be expected, the range of potential accessory uses under this approach is
virtually unlimited, since churches can sincerely pursue a variety of
activities as part of their religious mission. Indeed, courts that follow
this approach have appropriately shown significant deference to
churches when defining what is religious."'3 As a result, courts have
permitted such diverse activities as a softball field,2"' a coffee
house,2" 7 and a drug treatment center.2"'
These two approaches reflect the problems inherent in regulating

accessory church uses. Both sound land use planning and first amendment concerns require that churches be allowed to pursue some activities on their property beyond religious worship. A church's own
facility must be recognized as a unique and particularly significant
site for many of the activities a church might pursue and for which
some accommodation should be made.2" 9 Further, since it can be an-

ticipated that churches will engage in activities beyond worship,
municipalities should be obligated to some extent to consider this
fact in their initial zoning designations to avoid unnecessary burdens
on religion by requiring bifurcation of ministries. As a practical matter, municipalities apparently recognize these concerns and always
allow churches to engage in some accessory activities on their property.
214. Although most courts have not articulated a strong first amendment rationale in applying a "religious use" approach, courts have frequently emphasized that churches should be
free to perform their perceived mission, see, e.g., Synod of Chesapeake, Inc. v. City of
Newark, 254 A.2d 611 (Del. Ch. 1969), suggesting a right to be free from state interference.
215. These courts have generally defined the term "religious use" as uses conducted with a
religious purpose. See Slevin, 66 Misc. 2d at 315-16, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 943. In applying this standard, courts have recognized that churches must largely be responsible for determining how to
foster growth and fellowship and to best effectuate their various religious obligations.
Although courts require that churches articulate a religious purpose for a particular activity
such as a coffee house or drug treatment center, they have readily accepted the sincerity and
plausibility of the religious motivation behind such undertakings. Such deference to churches
is clearly warranted, since core religious concerns such as growth, strengthening fellowship
between members, and meeting societal needs can be accomplished in a variety of ways. For
this reason courts are quick to acknowledge the religious motivation and purpose behind such
activities. See, e.g., Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., I N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154
N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956).
216. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints v. Ashton, 92 Idaho 571, 448 P.2d 185 (1968).
217. Synod of Chesapeake, Inc. v. City of Newark, 254 A.2d 611 (Del. Ch. 1969).
218. Slevin v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 66 Misc. 2d 312, 319 N.Y.S.2d 937
(1971).
219. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text, discussing the need to accommodate
first amendment expression when regulating constitutionally significant fora. Such an accommodation analysis would also seem appropriate when examining the right of churches to use
their facilities for secondary activities because of the important role such facilities play in the
life of the church.
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At the same time, however, the preservation of residential
neighborhood quality requires some limitation on the activities a
church can pursue. Further, to allow churches virtually unlimited use
of their property makes it particularly difficult for a municipality to
assess a church's impact on surrounding land when enacting a comprehensive zoning ordinance. This, in turn, might encourage
municipalities to zone to the lowest common denominator, thereby
excluding many religious land uses that a municipality might deem
compatible with residential neighborhoods because of potentially
unique and disruptive activities. Not only would this possibly interfere with a municipality's interest in properly allocating land uses,
but might also result in greater locational restrictions on churches
than desirable from either a land use or first amendment perspective.
The "customarily incidental" standard might be viewed as a
reasonable attempt to balance these two conflicting concerns, since it
requires municipalities to anticipate and allow some secondary activities, and, yet, does not expose them to unforeseen uses that disrupt
surrounding neighborhoods. Although commentators have argued
that the "customarily incidental" standard poses establishment
clause problems because it requires the state to interpret religious
doctrine,"' this is not necessarily true. Courts and municipalities
should be prohibited from deciding accessory use questions based on
their perceptions of whether an activity is part of a particular
religion's beliefs.2" The determination of what is customary,
however, can properly be made from a land use perspective rather
220. See Reynolds, supra note 43, at 814; Note, Land Use Regulation, supra note 14, at
1572.
221. The Supreme Court has frequently noted that the state is not competent to make
substantive assessments of religious matters. This was recently articulated in Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), where the Court stated:
The determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice is more often than not
a difficult and delicate task, as the division in the Indiana Supreme Court attests.
However, the resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of
the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable,
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection.
Id. at 714. Later, the Court stated that "[p]articularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the
judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow
worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters
of scriptural interpretation." Id. at 716; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218
(1972).
The Court has expressed a similar sentiment in a line of cases involving intrafaith property
disputes. Although courts have little choice but to accept jurisdiction in such matters, the
Supreme Court has firmly stated that they must avoid questions "made to turn on the resolution . . . of controversies over religious doctrine and practice." Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
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than a theological perspective; that is, by focusing on land use experience as a reference point for the determination of whether the activity is "customary." Thus, restricting or prohibiting an activity
because it is not a "customary" church activity does not require a
determination of whether the use is religious in nature, but instead
merely requires that from a land use perspective the state determines
that the "use" is not customarily associated with churches.
The "customarily incidental" standard is flawed for other
reasons, however. First, the problems inherent in the test in other

contexts are accentuated with regard to churches. 222 Setting a
suitable reference point from which to judge what is "customary" is par-.
ticularly problematic when the test is applied to churches because of
their diverse characteristics.

22 3

Although courts at times avoid this

problem by characterizing the challenged activity very generally, this,
in effect, amounts to the more lenient "religious use" test. The standard is also potentially unresponsive to a religion's evolving under224
standing of its religious mission in today's society.

Even more problematic, however, is the discrimination inherent in
the "customarily incidental" approach. By its very nature, the standard is skewed towards traditional religious practices and dogma
because it uses normalcy as a reference point. The Supreme Court
has been particularly sensitive to legislative classifications which, in
effect, prefer one religion over another without a legitimate basis for
distinction.225 Although zoning regulations might have a different effect on first amendment uses where distinct secondary effects exist,2 26
the "customarily incidental" standard is not precisely drawn to that
end. Therefore, to the extent that the standard is a shorthand means
of assessing compatibility in other contexts, it lacks the precision
necessary to constitutionally regulate first amendment activity.

222. For criticisms of the problems inherent in the "customarily incidental" standard in
other contexts, see A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, § 40.02; Note, Zoning: Accessory Uses and
the Meaning of the "Customary" Requirements, 56 B.U.L. REV. 542, 546-49 (1976).
223. The "customarily incidental" standard requires a reference point from which to judge
whether a particular use is "customary." Problems arise in setting an appropriate time-frame
and geographic area by which to judge a particular use. Further problems arise in setting some
degree of use by which a use becomes "customary." See generally Note, supra note 222.
224. It has often been pointed out that if taken literally, the "customarily incidental"
standard would prohibit evolving uses of property. See, e.g., id. at 554.
225. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (Minnesota's charitable solicitations
act, which exempted from registration and reporting requirements only those religious
organizations that received more than half their contributions from members or affiliated
organizations, held to violate establishment clause because it discriminated between religions
and created a denominational preference).
226. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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Resolution of accessory use issues, therefore, is better addressed
by focusing on the actual problems posed by a particular activity
rather than categorically prohibiting uses because they are not "normal." Such an approach would recognize a church's right to engage
in activities related to its religious purpose or mission as long as the
activity does not substantially interfere with surrounding uses. The
focus of inquiry should be on the impact a particular secondary use
has on its surroundings. Although not a perfect solution, this approach
strikes a better balance between the planning needs of a community
and the religious activities of its churches.
Such a compatibility analysis would be premised on a showing that
the activity in question is part of the church's religious mission and,
thus, related to the land's primary use. Since courts, for the most part,
are precluded from evaluating religious doctrine, in practice this would
be a sincerity test.22 Assuming that the use is religious, the burden
would shift to the municipality to show that the activity is clearly incompatible in its neighborhood context. Although this is similar to
the determination made under time, place, and manner regulations,
it differs because it involves an individualized,, rather than a categorical,
assessment. Further, the mere fact that an analogous primary use would
be prohibited under applicable zoning regulations should not suffice
to establish incompatibility; rather, an actual showing based on specific
concerns should be required.
This approach is admittedly quite deferential to churches because
it presumes a right to engage in any activity related to a church's
religious mission and then requires the municipality to establish that
the activity is incompatible with surrounding property. Striking the
balance in this way, however, is justified for several reasons. First,
this approach avoids the extreme deference of the "religious use"
test on the one hand and the more intrusive and discriminatory
"customarily incidental" standard on the other. Second, giving
churches substantial freedom to pursue activities on their property is
a reasonable offset to municipal ability to locate churches. Finally,
the degree of interference with religious exercise is intuitively greater
when not only where a church can locate is limited, but what it can
do there is limited as well. Although in theory such regulations are
still only time, place, and manner restrictions, if the use is permitted

227. Although warning against judicial entanglement in evaluating religious doctrine, the
Supreme Court has frequently noted that free exercise claims are subject to a sincerity test to
avoid fraudulent claims. This is at best a truncated inquiry, however, since the focus is not
on the correctness of a belief, but on whether the claimant really believes it. See THomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981).
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elsewhere, dispersing the various activities of churches throughout a
municipality will obviously substantially burden religious exercise.22
The analysis proposed above can be demonstrated by its application to an issue of current significance, whether churches can use
their facilities to provide shelter for the homeless.229 There is little
question that such a use is sincere religious conduct for many
religions, because ministering to the poor and extending hospitality
are frequently dictated by the religion.23 Thus, the "religious use" approach taken by some courts would clearly allow it. Conversely,
despite its religious nature, such an activity cannot be viewed as a
normal or traditional use of church facilities, at least from a land use
perspective, and, therefore, could be prohibited under the
"customarily incidental" standard. The approach outlined above,
however, would allow the municipality to restrict the use only upon a
showing of clear incompatibility with its surrounding neighborhood.
Such a showing, of course, would depend upon surrounding land
uses. If the church is located in a high density residential or commercial district, providing shelter for the homeless would be compatible
and, thus, permissible. Even in a low density residential district the
municipality would have to show how such a use would substantially
interfere with surrounding properties. Increased noise and traffic,
as well as the possible intrusion upon surrounding neighborhoods,
would be legitimate concerns in this regard. Further, the municipality could impose reasonable secondary controls upon the activity,
such as noise limitations and building code restrictions.", As in the
case of special-use permits, however, unsubstantiated assertions of
state interest should not be considered adequate to interfere with the
church's mission.
The foregoing analysis is appropriate for most accessory use questions. The most common and significant accessory use issue today
concerns the use of churches for private, religious schools. Because
of the frequency with which the issue arises and the impor228. Although as discussed in section III the "narrowly tailored" means requirement is
usually not applied with rigor in time, place, and manner analysis, the Court has appeared to
require some accommodation when the restriction burdens first amendment exercise, such as
where it restricts a traditional place or means of expression. See, e.g., United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171 (1983).
229. See The Wash. Post, supra note 205, at 34-35 (Fairfax County, Virginia, conflict between churches and zoning board over, inter alia, attempts by churches to house the homeless
in their buildings); see also St. John's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Hoboken, 195 N.J.
Super. 414, 479 A.2d 935 (1983).
you shall not
230. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 15:7 ("If there is among you a poor man.
harden your heart or shut your hand against your poor brother, but you shall open your hand
to him, and lend him sufficient for his need, whatever it may be.").
231. See Reynolds, supra note 43, at 814-17.
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tant interests involved, the next subsection will address church
schools.
B.

Zoning the Church School

The most frequent and controversial accessory use issue arising today is whether churches may operate private religious schools or day
care centers on their premises. 232 That the issue arises with increasing
frequency is partly attributable to a growing dissatisfaction among
certain religious groups with public education and to the general proliferation of day care centers. Private religious schools, once the almost
exclusive realm of Catholicism, are now employed by a growing
number of conservative Protestant groups. " For obvious reasons,
these groups see advantages in using existing church facilities rather
than building or renting alternative sites.
Although the regulation of church schools is similar to other accessory
use issues because it concerns whether a church can use its facility for
a secondary activity, in several respects church school regulation differs. First, unlike most accessory uses, private schools are usually a
separately designated primary use in zoning ordinances."' This
separate treatment not only provides clear legislative intent regarding
locational restrictions on schools, ' but also provides a reference
point by which the distinct and often more intense effects of schools
can be evaluated.
Second, case law regarding accessory church schools has arisen in
more diverse ways than have other accessory use cases. Although
some cases have involved clear questions of whether a church could
operate a school as an accessory use,236 less intrusive forms of regulation have been involved more often, such as the requirement of a
separate special use permit for schools2 " or separate building code

232. See cases cited supra note 16.
233. The number of fundamentalist Christian schools has risen dramatically in the last
decade. There are currently about 20,000 such schools with over 1,000,000 students. The majority of these schools are located in churches. See Solorzano, supra note 15, at 46.
234. See, e.g., Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982);
Abram v. City of Fayetteville, 281 Ark. 63, 661 S.W.2d 371 (1983); Damascus Community
Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 610 P.2d 273 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450
U.S. 902 (1981).
235. See, e.g., Damascus Community Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065,
610 P.2d 273 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981) (suggesting that explicit treatment
of schools as separate primary use indicated that they were not intended to be accessory uses).
236. See Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982).
237. See, e.g., Abram v. City of Fayetteville, 281 Ark. 63, 661 S.W.2d 371 (1983); City of
Las Cruces v. Huerta, 102 N.M. 182, 692 P.2d 1331, cert. denied, 693 P.2d 591 (1984);
Damascus Community Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1965, 610 P.2d 273 (1980),
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requirements.23 8 These latter restrictions did not prohibit accessory
church schools per se, but instead attempted to apply separate and
more intensive land use regulations to schools than were already applicable to the church.
For these reasons, judicial review of zoning restrictions on church
schools has differed from and been more deferential than review of
other accessory uses.239 The common identification of schools as a
separate primary use has led courts to dispense with inquiries into
whether the use is "customary'' 2 0 and instead to focus on first
amendment issues raised by the restrictions. In this regard, courts
have viewed schools as encompassing land use concerns different
from churches and have held that separate restrictions are permissible as long as some provision is made for church schools
elsewhere.2"" In some cases, courts have noted that the challenged
restrictions did not prohibit an accessory church school, but only
regulated its manner of use.2" 2 In other instances, courts have held or
suggested that broader bans are permissible if provisions are made
elsewhere for schools, indicating there is little need to accommodate
schools on church'premises themselves.2" 3
appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981); see also State ex rel. Pringle v.Heritage Baptist Temple, 236 Kan. 544, 693 P.2d 1163 (1985).
238. See, e.g., Hough v. North Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich. App. 780, 312 N.W.2d 158
(1981); Antrim Faith Baptist Church v. Department of Labor and Indus., 75 Pa. Commw. 61,
460 A.2d 1228 (1983).
239. The majority of cases addressing accessory church school issues have upheld the
separate regulations involved. See First Assembly of God v. City of Alexandria, 739 F.2d
942 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984); Congregation of Beth Yitzchok of Rockland,
Inc. v.Town of Ramapo, 593 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Seward CHapel, Inc. v. City
of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982); Abram v. City of Fayetteville, 281 Ark. 63, 661
S.W.2d 371 (1983); Hough v. North Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich. App. 780, 312 N.W.
2d 158 (1981); City of Las Cruces v. Huerta, 102 N.M. 182, 692 P.2d 1331 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 102 N.M. 225, 693 P.2d 591 (1984); Medford Assembly of God v.City of Medford, 72
Or. App. 333, 695 P.2d 1379, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 570 (1985); Damascus Community
Church v.Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 610 P.2d 273 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450
U.S. 902 (1981); Antrim Faith Baptist Church v. Department of Labor and Indus., 75 Pa.
Commw.61, 460 A.2d 1228 (1983).
240. See, e.g., Damascus Community Church, 45 Or. App. at 1068-69, 610 P.2d at 276 (ordinance manifested clear intent to make the granting of and criteria for conditional use permits for churches and for religious schools different, by having different regulations for each).
But see City of Concord v. New Testament Baptist Church, 118 N.H. 56, 382 A.2d 377 (1978)
(interpreting a zoning ordinance which permitted as accessory uses those uses usually connected with a church to include parochial schools).
241. See cases cited supra note 239.
242. See, e.g., Congregation Beth Yitzchok, 593 F. Supp. at 664; Antrim Faith Baptist
Church, 75 Pa. Commw. at 65, 460 A.2d at 1229-30.
243. See Seward Chapel, Inc. v.City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982) (upholding
complete ban if provision for religious schools made elsewhere); Damascus Community
Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 610 P.2d 273 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450
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Despite this general acceptance of zoning restrictions on accessory
church schools, some precedent exists for treating church schools as
accessory uses. New York decisions have held that, because of the integral role played by religious education in the life of a church,
municipalities can not prohibit such uses.244 More recently in City of
Concord v. New Testament Baptist Church,245 the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that under an ordinance allowing "facilities
usually connected with a church," a church school must be permitted. The court stressed both the integral role that the school
played in the claimant's religion and the historical role that education had played in New England churches and concluded that churches were a permissible accessory use under the ordinance.2 "6 The
Washington Supreme Court reached a similar result in City of
Sumner v. FirstBaptist Church,2" 7 where it held that if the "practical
effect" of meeting either separate building code or zoning requirements was to add prohibitive costs to, and, thus, force closure
of, a school, there was an infringement of free exercise of religion.248
A careful reading of the various decisions suggests that analysis of
accessory church school issues should be approached on two different levels. The first and most basic question is whether the integral
U.S. 902 (1981) (upholding separate special-use provision for schools, but apparently suggesting that a complete ban would also be permissible).
244. Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 522-26, 136 N.E.2d 827,
834-36, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 559-62 (1956) (school was an accessory use to a church within
meaning of the local zoning ordinance); Westbury Hebrew Congregation, Inc. v. Downer, 59
Misc. 2d'387, 388, 302 N.Y.S.2d 923, 925 (1969) (use of a synagogue building for a parochial
school was an integral part of the functions and activities of the use of the synagogue and
therefore permissible).
245. 118 N.H. 56, 382 A.2d 377 (1978).
246. Id. at 58-60, 382 A.2d at 379-80. The court in Concord failed to articulate clearly why
it found the school to be a permissible use under the ordinance. Although it reviewed the
historical connection between sectarian schools and churches, it also employed by analogy a
balancing test used in determining state tax exemptions for various religious structures which
in effect permits churches to conduct activities "necessary to promote the institution's purposes." Id. at 59, 382 A.2d at 379. Use of this test, together with the court's conclusion that
"a school may be considered as an integral and inseparable part of a church," suggests that
although Concord must be viewed as a case involving statutory interpretation, it is steeped in
first amendment overtones. Id. at 60, 382 A.2d at 380.
247. 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982).
248. The Sumner decision actually involved six separate opinions, none of which commanded a majority of the court. A plurality opinion joined by three members primarily
developed the analysis discussed in the text. Id. at 7, 639 P.2d at 1362. One of the two concurring decisions agreed with the plurality's use of a strict scrutiny standard of review when
the financial restraints on meeting zoning or building requirements were prohibitive. Id. at
15, 639 P.2d at 1366 (Utter, J.,concurring). Thus, a four person majority essentially agreed
with the above analysis. For a general discussion and criticism of Sumner decision, see Note,
Constitutional Review of Building Codes and Zoning Ordinances Applied to Parochial
Schools: City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 607 (1984).
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role that education plays in the life of many churches prohibits
municipalities from applying distinct land use controls to schools
housed in churches. As noted, most accessory church school cases
have in fact involved regulations which did not necessarily prohibit
the school, but instead attempted to apply additional land use or
building standards to the proposed schools. Churches have consistently challenged even these secondary controls, on the ground that
religious schools qualify as a church use and, therefore, are already
encompassed within the regulations applicable to churches generally. 2" 9 Thus, churches have argued that a school's integral relationship to their mission eliminates the need for additional controls.
Such a perspective fails to distinguish properly between the
theological relevance and the land use relevance of an activity.
Although religious schools certainly are integral to many religions25
and deserve constitutional protection, 25 ' zoning controls are based
on the land use characteristics of an activity. As previously discussed, courts have necessarily focused on the distinct secondary
land use effects of first amendment uses to justify their regulation.
This focus also applies to accessory uses, where a municipality
should be able to assess separately the compatibility of proposed uses
with surrounding property. Thus, the integral religious nature of an
activity should not limit a municipality's right to regulate distinct
land use concerns that might exist.
This analysis is particularly relevant to accessory church schools,
which potentially have land use effects and building needs quite

249. See, e.g., First Assembly of God v. City of Alexandria, 739 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.) cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984); Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska
1982); City of Las Cruces v. Huerta, 102 N.M. 182, 692 P.2d 1331 (Ct. App. 1984).
250. Indeed, this assertion has never been challenged even in those cases upholding
municipal regulations. See, e.g., Damascus Community Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or.
App. 1065, 1070-71, 610 P.2d 273, 275 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981).
251. There is little doubt that proper education of its young is an integral and central
aspect of many religions. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the state must allow
religious groups opportunities for alternative education. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. at 247 ("[I]f the State must satisfy its interest in secular education through the instrument
Oregon law which prohibited parents from sending their children to private parochial schools
as an alternative to public education. Id. at 534-35. This holding has been implicitly affirmed
in a number of cases reviewing state regulation of religious schools. See, e.g., Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
Although these cases firmly establish the right to provide private religious education, the
Supreme Court has frequently recognized the state's significant interest in educational matters
and thus its right to impose reasonable regulations on sectarian schools. See, e.g., Allen, 392
U.S. at 247 ("[I1f the State must satisfy its interest in secular education through the instrument
of private schools, it has a proper interest in the manner in which those schools perform their
secular educational function.").

19871

RELIGIOUS ZONING

distinct from churches generally. In many instances, a school is a
more intense land use than a church because of the greater frequency
of use. 252 Moreover, the younger constituency of schools poses
potentially distinct health and safety concerns.25 3 To allow a separate
assessment of these concerns neither prohibits the activity nor questions its religious importance; rather, it simply recognizes that valid
land use distinctions exist that justify a separate assessment of
building and locational standards.
The second and more difficult accessory church school issue is
whether some accommodation of a church's desire to use their
facilities for schools should be required, rather than allowing
municipalities to exclude them per se. As suggested in the previous
section, the necessity of allowing churches to engage in some accessory uses is best achieved by an individualized compatibility standard
rather than by an outright prohibition of a particular use.2

4

1

This

standard requires accommodation to the extent that a particular use
is compatible with its surroundings, but allows the prohibition of
uses that are actually disruptive and the application of secondary
controls. Arguably, however, the traditional treatment of schools as
a separate primary use provides sufficient land use experience from
which to recognize that schools are a more intensive land use than
churches are and, thus, do not require a particularized assessment.
Although such an approach is perhaps administratively attractive,
it should be rejected as unnecessarily burdensome on religious exercise for several reasons. First, the fact that schools are generally
recognized as a distinct and more intensive land use than churches
does not mean they are necessarily incompatible with a particular
church's neighborhood. In certain situations, the nature of the school
and its actual location will indicate that the school can be accommodated without ill-effects.2 55 Accommodation in such circumstances is particularly important because of the admittedly integral

252. Abram v. City of Fayetteville, 281 Ark. 63, 65, 661 S.W.2d 371, 372 (1983).
253. Antrim Faith Baptist Church v. Department of Labor and Indus., 75 Pa. Commw.
61, 64, 460 A.2d 1228, 1230 (1983).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 225-31.
255. Another potential reason for regulating accessory church schools is based on the
state's own admittedly strong interest in education. Allowing churches to use their facilities for
schools, however, does not in itself affect the state's educational interest, but only its land use
interest. The state's very high interest in education can obviously be addressed in ways that do
not bear upon the location of church schools. Specifically, the state's educational interest concerns what children are learning, not where they are learning it. This can be addressed by
regulations such as curriculum requirements and teacher certification. Thus, when examining
zoning issues concerning church schools, the state's interest is not education but the external
land use effects of the school, an important but certainly not as significant an interest as
education.
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role that education plays in a church. Indeed, Supreme Court precedent recognizes the right to provide such education and argues in
favor of making some accommodation.2 56

Second, sensitivity to the needs of smaller congregations suggests
that the use of their own facilities should be considered as a rational
alternative to securing other facilities. Although the first amendment
does not guarantee that rights be exercised by the least expensive
means, the Court has shown sensitivity to protecting particularly ap-

propriate fora for the exercise of rights.257 The expense and inconve-

nience of providing alternative facilities for a church school will cer-

tainly deter some churches from pursuing this integral aspect of their
religion. The recognition that churches have a right to use their
facilities for schools, subject to appropriate building code require-

ments and assessment of the use's compatibility with surrounding
property, is an appropriate accommodation of the needs of churches
without exposing municipalities to disruptive uses.2"'
Requiring an individual assessment of the propriety of church

schools obviously does not mean that they are beyond regulation. It
simply means that the municipality has the burden of showing that
the school would be incompatible with surrounding property uses,
with the focus on such factors as actual intensity of use. 5 9 Further,
even when the church school is allowed to operate, the municipality
should be able to require compliance with separate building codes to
ensure the safety of the students. 6 ° The nature of the use and the
See supra note 251.
See supra notes 160-61.
258. Accommodating the needs of churches, and in particular smaller congregations, in
this manner should not mean that a church's free exercise rights are violated if compliance
costs are prohibitive, as suggested in City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1,
639 P.2d 1358 (1982). Premising a free exercise violation on the financial ability of a particular
church to comply with land use controls is problematic in several regards. First, the mere
financial costs of complying with government regulations has not normally been sufficient to
establish a free exercise violation; rather, the claimant must be penalized for exercising a
religious belief. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. Second, and more important,
determining when costs become prohibitive would entangle the state in assessing a church's
choices in how it spends its money. Thus, although financial concerns should be relevant in addressing the issue of church schools, they are better addressed by a general recognition that
churches can use their facilities subject to reasonable land use requirements than by an individualized assessment of whether costs are prohibitive in any particular case.
259. Prohibiting private religious schools in churches while permitting public schools in a
district arguably violates content-neutrality concerns in that both uses generate similar external
effects. Courts have split with regard to the issue. See Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City
of Piedmont, 45 Cal. 2d 325, 289 P.2d 438 (1955) (holding such an ordinance invalid);
Catholic Bishop v. Kingery, 371 II1. 257, 20 N.E.2d 583 (1939) (holding ordinance invalid);
State ex. rel. Wisconsin Lutheran High School Conference v. Sinar, 267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d
43 (1954), appeal dismissed, 349 U.S. 913 (1955) (holding ordinance valid).
260. See, e.g., Hough v. North Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich. App. 780, 312 N.W.2d 158
256.
257.
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constituency of the users of schools is substantially different from

that of churches and justifies separate regulations. Moreover, as in
the case of special-use permits, municipalities should be able to require reasonable land use modifications, such as parking requirements or minor landscaping, to mitigate the external effects of the
use on its surroundings.26 '
The approach outlined above, which recognizes a church's right to
use its facilities for private schools subject to assessment of com-

patibility and secondary controls, is not necessarily inconsistent with
decisions allowing municipalities to restrict church schools.
Although some of these cases have involved blanket prohibitions on
church schools in particular districts,2 62 more frequently the
challenged regulation did not per se prohibit church schools but subjected the school to separate building code provisions,263 landscaping
modifications,2 61 or a special-use permit process. 26' As such, the
regulations potentially recognized the right of the church to use its
facilities for a school, subject to these secondary controls. This
strikes a reasonable balance between the needs of both the church

and the community.

(1981); Antrim Faith Baptist Church v. Department of Labor and Indus., 75 Pa. Commw. 61,
460 A.2d 1228 (1983).
261. See First Assembly of God v. City of Alexandria, 739 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1019 (1984) (church school required to erect a fence and shrubbery barrier between
the school and the surrounding neighborhood).
262. See, e.g., Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982);
Abram v. City of Fayetteville, 281 Ark. 63, 661 S.W.2d 371 (1983).
263. See Hough v. North Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich. App. 780, 312 N.W.2d 158
(1981); Antrim Faith Baptist Church v. Department of Labor and Indus., 75 Pa. Commw. 61,
460 A.2d 1228 (1983).
264. See First Assembly of God v. City of Alexandria, 739 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1019 (1984).
265. See, e.g., Abram v. City of Fayetteville, 281 Ark. 63, 661 S.W.2d 371 (1983); City of
Las Cruces v. Huerta, 102 N.M. 182, 692 P.2d 1331 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 102 N.M. 225
693 P.2d 591 (1984); Damascus Community Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065,
610 P.2d 273 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981). Similarly, several cases have not
specifically involved special-use permits under a zoning ordinance, but licensing requirements
under state law. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pringle v. Heritage Baptist Temple, 236 Kan. 544, 693
P.2d 1163 (1985). Again, this does not involve a complete ban on churches using their facilities
for schools, but rather a regulation of such use.
The Supreme Court's summary disposition of the appeal in Damascus Community Church
v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 610 P.2d 273 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 902
(1981), admittedly poses a potential problem in that it represents Supreme Court precedent as
to the narrow issues involved. The issue involved in Damascus, however, was whether a church
school could be made subject to a separate special-use permit requirement distinct from that
applicable to the church itself. To the extent that it did not involve an outright ban but rather
an individualized assessment of the propriety of a school in the church, it is compatible with
the analysis presented in the text.
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RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES IN THE HOME

Most religious zoning cases have involved locational restrictions
on conventional church buildings and the regulation of accessory uses.
Issues concerning the application of zoning restrictions to religious
activities in private homes, however, have emerged in the last several
years. Two recent cases have construed zoning ordinances that excluded churches from a residential district as prohibiting worship services in a private home. Further, although there have been no reported
cases on point, municipalities have attempted to interpret such ordinances as prohibiting less formal home religious assembly such as
Bible studies or prayer meetings. This section will explore the permissible scope of zoning ordinances regulating home religious
assembly.
Case law involving zoning restrictions on religious activities in
private homes has been limited to challenges of worship services held
in private homes. In Grosz v. City of Miami Beach26 6 , the Eleventh
Circuit held that a city could constitutionally prohibit an Orthodox
rabbi from holding regular worship services in his garage. In Grosz,
the plaintiff's religion required that he conduct religious services
twice daily in a congregation of at least ten adult males. Shortly after
moving into his residence, which was in a zone prohibiting churches,
Grosz remodeled his garage and began holding worship services
there twice daily. Most services involved ten to twenty people and
caused no substantial disturbance to the neighborhood. Wellattended services reached as high as fifty people, however, and
disturbed neighbors as a result of people seeking directions to the
home, and chanting and singing during the services. 26 Because of
neighbors' complaints, the City of Miami Beach gave Grosz a "notice
of violation," that threatened prosecution if the activity continued.26
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted the zoning ordinance as prohibiting the conduct in question, and directed itself only to the free exercise issues raised by Grosz.269 In finding no first amendment violation, the court applied a balancing test, and held that the city's
interest in preserving the quality of residential neighborhoods by
controlling traffic and noise outweighed what it viewed as an incidental burden on religion.27 The court emphasized that the zoning
266. 721 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984).
267. Id. at 731-32.
268. Id. The City of Miami Beach said that it "would not prosecute plaintiffs for praying
in their home, with ten friends, neighbors, and relatives," thus suggesting that it was the level
of the activity that the city considered prohibited and to which the court directed its attention.
Id. at 732.
269. Id. at 733.
270. Id. at 740-41.
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ordinance allowed religious institutions to locate in one-half of the
city, and, therefore, the religious practices could be conducted
elsewhere.2 7' Thus, it viewed the restriction as a reasonable time,
place, and manner regulation of a church's location, and in fact
made no mention of the fact that the activity occurred on the Grosz'
residential property.
In State v. Cameron,2" a case similar to Grosz, a New Jersey
Court of Appeals ruled that the defendant, an Episcopalian minister,
violated a zoning ordinance by holding worship services in his home.
The defendant and his congregation of fifteen to twenty people worshipped weekly in his home, which was located in an area zoned exclusively for single family residences. The congregation had
previously rented a room in a school for Sunday services, but had
been forced to move when the rent was raised. The city ordered
Cameron to cease holding services after a neighbor complained that
he could hear the sermon and singing in his home and that parked
cars hindered traffic on the street.273
As in Grosz, the court of appeals in Cameron interpreted the ordinance's prohibition of churches as applying to organized worship
services in private homes. 7 Similarly, the court said that the state's
interest in regulating the noise, traffic, and congestion caused by
churches outweighed the incidental burden on the defendant's first
amendment rights. The court applied a time, place, and manner
analysis, and found that the regulation furthered an important
government interest in a narrowly tailored means.27 5
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the court of
276
appeals, holding that the ordinance was vague in defining "church.
The court noted that the ordinance contained no definition of church
and that the term was susceptible to a number of interpretations.
Although the court stated that in some situations the ordinance could
be applied without raising questions of vagueness, such as with regard
to buildings specifically built for religious worship, the court held
that it was not clear from the ordinance what type of conduct turned
a single family residence into a church. Therefore, as applied to the

271. Id. at 740.
272. 189 N.J. Super. 404, 460 A.2d 191 (1983), rev'd, 100 N.J. 586, 498 A.2d 1217 (1985).
The court of appeals majority opinion in Cameron adopted the holding and reasoning of the
municipal court opinion found at 184 N.J. Super. 66, 445 A.2d 75 (1982), adding only a paragraph
of its own regarding whether the activity met the definition of a church. Thus, references to
the court of appeals decision in fact are to the municipal court decision which it adopted.
273. 184 N.J. Super. at 69-70, 445 A.2d at 76-78.
274. 189 N.J. Super. at 405, 460 A.2d at 192.
275. 184 N.J. Super. at 76-82, 445 A.2d at 78-80.
276. State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586, 599, 498 A.2d 1217, 1225 (1985).
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defendant in Cameron, the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague.277
The decision left open, however, the possibility of a more precisely
drawn ordinance that could constitutionally prohibit religious assembly
in a private residence.278
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Cameron
demonstrates sensitivity to the inevitable problem of distinguishing
between permissible and impermissible religious assembly in private
homes. Indeed, there have been a number of incidents in recent
years in which municipalities have attempted to prohibit more informal religious gatherings in private homes, such as Bible studies or
prayer groups. One religious organization has reported over one
hundred such incidents in the last several years. 279 The challenged activities have ranged from meetings of small groups of two or three
for a catechism class to large group meetings for Bible teaching,
prayer, and singing.28 Municipalities' rationales for the attempted
prohibitions have been that such activities, in effect, constitute churches and, therefore, are either prohibited from the particular zone or
subject to special-use requirements. Although these incidents have
" ' the frequent use
yet to generate case law, 28
of private homes for
various forms of religious assembly suggests that the problem will
not go away.
The issue of how and whether home religious assembly can be
regulated fundamentally concerns a municipality's ability to regulate
the use of private, residential property. As with other primary uses,
municipalities attempt to control the external effects of residential
land use in two general ways. The first is to limit, through accessory
use provisions, the nature of the activities that can occur on the
property. Ordinances and courts typically allow for accessory uses on
residential property, usually requiring that the use be related to the
277. Id. at 594-99, 498 A.2d at 1223-25.
278. The majority decision in the New Jersey Supreme Court's disposition of Cameron
relied on vagueness grounds to invalidate the statute, suggesting that a more precisely drawn
statute might have been constitutional. The court also hinted, however, that perhaps the proper way to address such problems was enforcement of the existing, more narrowly drawn
statutes aimed at noise, parking, and similar problems. Id. at 600, 498 A.2d at 1224-25. The
court was ambiguous as to whether municipal attempts to define more precisely the prohibited
conduct would suffice if they categorically prohibited a particular type of religious assembly in
a home.
279. The Center for Law and Religious Freedom reports that over 100 such incidents have
occurred over the last several years in this country. See Center for Law and Religious
Freedom, supra note 18, at 3. Five such occurrences are reviewed in detail in Comment, supra
note 18.
280. See Comment, supra note 18.
281. In the vast majority of cases the municipalities involved apparently changed their
position and allowed the informal religious gathering to continue. See Center for Law and
Religious Freedom, supra note 18, at 3; Comment, supra note 18, at 786-87 nn.l-3.
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principal use and be "customarily incidental" to it. 282 This form of
regulation involves a categorical prohibition of certain activities
regardless of whether there is a showing of actual incompatibility
with the surrounding neighborhood. Such an approach is generally
supported by the expectations of the parties and generalizations that
can be presumed about activities not "customarily" found with
residential uses.283
A second means of controlling the external effects of residential
property is through secondary regulations aimed at the effects
themselves as opposed to a particular use. Regulations can be
set to limit noise levels, restrict parking along streets, and regulate
traffic flow in residential neighborhoods. These secondary regulations recognize that even permissible land uses generate external effects that must be controlled to ensure maximum enjoyment of the
land. Moreover, a municipality may enjoin any activity, whether
categorically prohibited or not, if it is a genuine nuisance.""
Viewed from a broader perspective, therefore, the issue of whether
zoning ordinances can be applied to prohibit home religious
assembly is not whether the activity can be regulated, but what form
of regulation is constitutionally permissible. As previously discussed,
the first amendment status of an activity does not immunize it from
reasonable regulation. At a minimum, first amendment conduct in a
private home is subject to the secondary controls mentioned above.
Whether the state should also be able to categorically prohibit such
activities as impermissible accessory uses should be examined more
closely.
The rationale for allowing municipalities to categorically prohibit
churches as a primary land use is that reasonable generalizations can
be made about their basic incompatibility with residential zones.
Because zoning restrictions are designed to regulate land uses and
not structures, a similar rationale for prohibition might exist even if
the church use is only a secondary and not a primary use of the land.
Thus, as interpreted by both the Eleventh Circuit in Grosz and the
lower courts in Cameron, an activity prohibited as a primary use
should per se be considered outside the scope of permissible accessory uses, since the state's interest in land use regulation is the same
in both instances. 28 5 Thus, to the extent that a religious service can
See A. RATHKOPF, supra note 7, § 23.01; see also Note, supra note 222.
See supra text accompanying notes 207-08.
284. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979); W. KEETON, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 643 (5th ed. 1984); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning:
Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHi. L. REV. 681, 719-42
(1973).
285. This analysis was implicit in the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Grosz, since it treated
282.
283.
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be reasonably viewed as a "church" use within the terms of the zoning ordinance, arguably, it can be prohibited even as a secondary
use in a private home.
Although this approach makes sense in other land use contexts, it
is problematic as an approach to regulating home religious assembly
for two reasons. First, although, as noted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Cameron, the term "church" has a core meaning
that involves a use primarily for purposes of religious assembly and
worship, it is more difficult to find determinative factors that turn
home assembly into a "church." ' Further, the generalizations
regarding intensity of use that support restrictions on churches as a
primary use are less compelling when the assembly is located in a
private residence and secondary to the primary residential use. In
such situations, the number of participants are fewer and the frequency of use for religious purposes is far less. Thus, the incompatibility concerns that typically accompany churches that are a primary
land use in a residential neighborhood are diminished.
Second, and more importantly, even if the religious assembly, when
viewed as a primary use, might be prohibited, a sufficient first
amendment justification for the activity might exist because of its
relationship to the primary residential use of the property. Foremost
in such an analysis are content-neutrality concerns that arise when
religious activity in a person's home is singled out for categorical
prohibition. Zoning ordinances clearly permit, as accessory uses,
various social activities, such as dinners, political discussions, or parties, that involve nonresidents in a person's home.2"' To discriminate
against informal religious activities because of their content clearly
violates the content-neutrality requirements that are at the heart of
first amendment jurisprudence. Even if the challenged activity is a
regular religious meeting, such as a weekly Bible study, it is indistinguishable from any other regular form of entertainment that
homeowners engage in and which generates traffic and noise. For
this reason, the earlier mentioned attempts at prohibiting informal
home religious assembly, such as Bible studies and prayer meetings,
clearly run afoul of the first amendment.
the case as merely involving a location restriction on churches. The lower courts in Cameron
more directly addressed the issue, however, and held that the meeting of religious adherents on
a permanent basis constituted a "church."
286. See 100 N.J. at 598-99, 498 A.2d at 1223-24.
287. Such practices are so common place and well-accepted in our society that there is no
case law regarding municipal attempts to prohibit such activities. In addressing other concerns, however, courts have occasionally alluded to the right to use residences for social purposes. See, e.g., Borough of Chatham v. Donaldson, 69 N.J. Super. 277, 282, 174 A.2d 213,
216 (1961) (residential use includes "use for private religious, educational, cultural, and
recreational advantages of family") (emphasis omitted).
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Similar content-neutrality arguments can be made even with
regard to the more formal, regular worship services involved in
Cameron and Grosz. For Rabbi Grosz to have up to fifty people in
his home for worship is no different than neighbors having fifty people in their home for a party. A possible distinction, of course, is the
scope of the activity, either in terms of size or regularity. To have
people in your home on a regular basis, or to occasionally have large
numbers there, is a normal residential use, but to do both is uncommon and might be viewed as unsuitable for that locale. Such concerns, however, should permit regulation of the scope of the activity
but should not necessarily permit a categorical prohibition. As will
be discussed below, content-neutral limitations might be put on such
activities pursuant to the equal protection clause.
In addition to equal protection concerns, a "minimum access"
right to use one's home for various forms of religious assembly
arguably exists because the home is a unique and constitutionally
' This
significant setting for the exercise of first amendment rights. 88
89
was alluded to in Stanley v. Georgia, where the Supreme Court
held that a person could not be convicted for possessing obscene
material in the privacy of his home, even though such material was
not protected elsewhere.2 9° In reaching this result, the Court was
primarily concerned with a right of autonomy inherent in the first
amendment to form ideas and thoughts free from state
interference. 9 ' Implicit in this reasoning was a recognition that the
home is an especially significant place in which to exercise such a
right.
Certainly the finding of a violation of such a first amendment
right must be limited to the facts of Stanley, in which the activity was
confined within the four walls of the home and did not involve
nonresidents. Neither privacy nor first amendment concerns immunize first amendment exercise from regulation just because it occurs in
the home.2 92 Yet, the suggestion in Stanley that a personal residence
is a particularly unique and significant setting for first amendment
288. Such an analysis is analogous to "minimum access" theories regarding public fora,
which argue that, aside from "equal access" concerns, the state must provide some minimum
access to traditional public fora such as parks and streets. See infra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
289. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
290. Id. at 559.
291. Id. at 566. The Court emphasized that by attempting to control the contents of a person's library, as the ordinance attempted to do, the state was trying to control the person's
mind. It was this significant state intrusion into a person's right to form his or her own ideas
and beliefs that the Court found particularly repulsive in Stanley. Id. at 565-66.
292. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (holding that the state can regulate
homosexual conduct even in the privacy of a home).
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exercise293 should apply with some force to associational exercise as
well.294

Such a view can be supported by recognizing the unique setting
that a private residence provides for associational exercise. The
Supreme Court has frequently recognized that associations with
others to solidify and advance personal beliefs are essential to the exercise of first amendment rights. 2" The self-realization values inherent in the free speech and free exercise clauses, to a large extent, are
29 6
dependent on interactions with others in a conducive atmosphere.

Such associational exercise is intuitively freest and fullest in an
adherent's own home. This is particularly important for religious
worship and assembly, which frequently must find expression in an
intimate community.
Besides its conduciveness to first amendment exercise, the use of
private residences

for first amendment assembly arguably is

293. On one other occasion the Court has suggested that there is some constitutional
significance to exercise of first amendment rights on one's residential property. In Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), the Court, in reversing on first amendment grounds a conviction for improper display of a flag, noted among other considerations that the flag was
displayed from the defendant's own apartment. Id. at 409. Although noting that it was a
significant factor that the flag was displayed on Spence's own property, the Court did not
elaborate on its significance. Id.
294. The Supreme Court's decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)
should not be read as precluding recognition of the home as a constitutionally significant setting for the exercise of associational rights. Although the Court in Belle Terre held that a zoning ordinance which prohibited more than two unrelated adults from living in the same
household did not violate associational or privacy rights, the decision can be distinguished in
several important regards. First, the conduct involved in Belle Terre did not involve any first
amendment exercise which was of critical concern to the Court in Stanley in recognizing a constitutional significance to the home. Second, the Court in Belle Terre emphasized in the context of not finding the implication of a fundamental right that the ordinance did not prohibit
the claimants from associating with others in their home. Id. at 8-9. Although not too much
should be made of this statement, since its significance was left totally undeveloped, it suggests
that the Court in Belle Terre considered attempts to regulate the right to associate with others
in one's own home to be of a different magnitude than regulating living arrangements. As
such, the Court's deferential attitude toward a municipality's right to regulate household living arrangements should not be interpreted as necessarily allowing as extensive a right to order
how a homeowner might associate with others in his home.
295. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Although the Court has not recognized the right to association as
an independent constitutional right, it has given it considerable significance where it is used to
further separately protected goals, such as that of free speech.
296. Extensive commentary has been devoted to exploring the values inherent in and furthered by the free speech clause. Although the vital role free speech plays in sustaining a
politically free society is perhaps most often cited, commentators frequently emphasize the
self-realization value furthered by free speech. Indeed, some commentators argue that it is the
only adequate basis on which to support the clause. See, e.g., M. REDISH, FREEDOM OFEXPRESSION 9-39 (1984).
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necessary to insure adequate fora for the associational exercise of
rights. Although financial burdens per se have not been grounds for
finding a violation of first amendment rights,29 7 in formulating its
time, place, and manner jurisprudence the Court has been sensitive
to ostensibly neutral restrictions that fall more heavily on the poor.2 98
This has been most apparent in public forum cases, in which the Court
has guarded particular fora or media of expression that have been
traditionally necessary for the exercise of first amendment rights. Thus,
the Court has recognized the need to make public parks and streets
availale for some communicative conduct.2 99 Similarly, the Court has
been particularly sensitive to bans on leafletting because of the role
it plays as an inexpensive form of communication.30
Arguably, a private residence plays an analogous role as a guarded
fora for the associational aspects of first amendment exercise. The
home is at least as basic and fundamental a forum for first amendment association as the parks and streets are to communication. A
group's inability to afford special accommodations, either because
of size or financial circumstance, should not preclude it from making
use of a member's home for corporate activities. This is particularly
true for corporate religious assembly where there is often a need for
smaller or newer congregations to meet in homes."' Indeed, in
Lakewood, Ohio Congregationof Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of
Lakewood the Sixth Circuit, in discussing alternatives for the congregation, suggested that it was free to worship in members' homes
if financially precluded from securing property elsewhere. 02
Although this should not be considered an adequate alternative for
congregations that desire a specialized structure, it should be considered a minimum alternative for groups unable to meet elsewhere.
Recognizing the constitutional significance of the home for the exercise of first amendment rights does not preclude reasonable regulation of such activities. It suggests, however, that a categorical prohibition should be rejected in favor of the use of neutral criteria
designed to regulate the secondary effects of the activity. Such an approach recognizes a minimum right to one's own home for religious

297. See supra note 90.
298. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) ("Door to door distribution
of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people."); L. TRIaE, supra note
112.
299. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
300. See supra note 299.
301.

See, e.g., State v. Cameron, 184 N.J. Super. 66, 69-70, 445 A.2d 75, 78-80 (1982)

(small and new congregation meeting in home for financial reasons).
302. 699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983).
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assembly even of a formal, regular, and organized nature. The external land use effects of the activity can be controlled, however, by
secondary regulations that govern noise, parking, and traffic. Such a
regulatory approach strikes a proper balance between the first
amendment rights of homeowners and the need to preserve residential neighborhoods.
In addition to such secondary controls, two other potential limitations on religious activities in private homes exist. First, of course, is
that the primary use of the property must remain residential; once
religious assembly becomes the property's primary use it would be
subject to the regulations governing churches. This is so because the
right to some minimum use of the property for religious assembly
derives from its relation to the property's primary status as residential and its concomitant constitutional significance. This justification
would be lost were the property's residential status to become secondary.
A second additional control is that home religious activities can be
enjoined as a nuisance if they substantially interfere with surrounding property. Such a determination would require a finding both that
the level of activity is unsuitable for the neighborhood and that it
substantially interferes with the neighbors' enjoyment of their property.3" 3 This necessitates inquiry into the normal level of activity for
that particular neighborhood. If it is customary to have large parties
on a regular basis, certainly large worship services with regularity must be tolerated. Only if the level of activity were truly unusual
in such settings and, thus, unsuitable for the particular locale,
should the activity be enjoined.
Further, home religious assembly should be enjoined only if it
substantially interferes with the enjoyment of the surrounding land.
The Supreme Court's emphasis on the necessity of a "substantial"
state interest to support restrictions on first amendment rights clearly
suggests that society must tolerate some inconvenience resulting
from first amendment exercise. Although this standard might not be
binding in private nuisance actions, in nuisance actions courts typically
regard the social value of the interfering use as an important factor
in determining whether a nuisance exists.3"4 First amendment
jurisprudence, therefore, can be looked at as a recognition of the
303. Nuisance law requires an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the
land of another. Unreasonableness is usually determined by a balancing test involving a
number of factors, a primary one being the suitability of the particular use to its locale. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826-828 (1979).
304. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that an intentional nuisance is established if the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct. Id. § 826. Among
the factors considered in assessing the utility of the actor's conduct is the social value attached
to his conduct. Id. § 828.
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high value society places on expressive and religious conduct, which
should be factored into the nuisance balancing process.
Thus, in balancing the interests involved to determine whether a
nuisance exists, mere inconvenience to neighbors should not be
enough to overcome the first amendment interest. This means that
some level of activity beyond that normally occurring in a residential
neighborhood must be allowed. In Grosz, for example, even though
the meeting of fifty or sixty people on a regular basis might be enjoined if incompatible with the neighborhood, the regular meeting of
fifteen to twenty people, subject to appropriate noise, parking, and
traffic regulations, should not be considered a nuisance." 5 Similarly,
the limited worship examined in Cameron, which involved about fifteen to twenty people, should be viewed as constitutionally protected.
In sum, courts should recognize a right to use private residences
for home religious assembly. Both equal protection and first amendment concerns suggest that such activity should not be subject to
categorical prohibition, but instead should be regulated through
secondary controls such as noise and parking regulations, and if
necessary, through nuisance actions. This is particularly true for informal gatherings, such as small Bible studies or prayer meetings,
which are indistinguishable in terms of the effects generated from
numerous social and recreational uses of homes that are clearly permitted. Even more formal religious activities, such as regular worship, should not be categorically prohibited, but should instead be
regulated by the less restrictive means test described above. Such an
approach best strikes a balance between the first amendment rights
of homeowners and the property rights of neighbors.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The intensification of religious land uses in recent years, coupled
with growing municipal concerns of preserving residential areas, has
led to increased conflict between churches and their surrounding
communities. This has involved not only traditional issues regarding
locational restrictions on churches, but also with increasing frequency the issues of what activities churches can pursue and even the
issue of what rights homeowners have to use their property for
religious assembly and worship. This article has argued that, although
churches can be made subject to zoning and other land use controls,

305. This in fact corresponds to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Grosz, where the court
stated that it would not necessarily enjoin a more limited level of activity in Rabbi Grosz's
home. Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 732 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 827 (1984).
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first amendment concerns require an intermediate standard of reivew
to assess the validity of such restrictions. This is in contrast to more
traditional analysis, which is unnecessarily deferential to churches
on the one hand, and recent suggestions by some courts that only
a "mere rationality" standard should be applied, which is too strict
on the other hand.
In particular, the first amendment permits locational restrictions
on churches, both in terms of special-use permits and blanket exclusions from residential neighborhoods, if they are applied in a
content-neutral manner and leave ample alternative sites for religious
exercise. When accessory uses are regulated, however, greater
deference should be given churches, both because of neutrality concerns and the need to make reasonable accommodation of churches.
This, in essence, changes the focus of analysis from a categorical to an
individual assessment of a particular use's compatibility with surrounding property. A similar analysis is applicable to home religious
assembly, where both equal protection and first amendment concerns require that such activities are not categorically prohibited but
instead are regulated by secondary controls.

